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Ebola Does Not Fall from the Sky:
Structural Violence
International Responsibility
Matiangai Sirleaf*
ABSTRACT

This Article challenges the conventional understandingthat
internationalcrises are limited to instances of direct physical violence. Instead, it argues that the disproportionate distribution
of infectious diseases like Ebola is a form of structural violence
that warrants internationalintervention. In the field of global
public health, structural violence is a concept used to describe
health inequities and to draw attention to the differential risks
for infection in the Global South, and among those already infected, for adverse consequences including death, injury, and illness. This Article clarifies how the concept of structural violence
can be operationalized in law. It illustrates the ways in which
actors can facilitate conditions for structuralviolence by analyzing the internationalpublic health and peace and security regimes.
This Article has several important contributions. First, the
way internationalactorsconceptualize crises should be expanded
beyond merely addressingdirectphysical violence, but to also include remedying structural violence. Additionally, this study indicates that the complicated relationship between infectious diseases and conflict deserves more robust attention and resources.
Moreover, this study examines the limits of the law governing international responsibility and concludes that shared international responsibility norms should be developed to assist in expanding the tools available for the protection of human rights.
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Lastly, this Article finds that the burgeoning field of international disasterlaw holds promise for responding to the challenges
posed by infectious diseases like Ebola and the alleviation of
large-scale human suffering caused by such diseases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, infectious diseases cause approximately 25 percent of all
deaths around the world,' and over thirty infectious diseases have
emerged during the last twenty years. 2 Due to the increasing interconnectedness of the world, the need for effective international regulation
of highly infectious diseases cannot be overstated, especially for developing countries in the Global South. 3 As Jim Yong Kim, President of
the World Bank (WB), remarked, the "Ebola crisis in Guinea, Liberia
and Sierra Leone taught all of us that we must be much more vigilant
to outbreaks and respond immediately to save lives and also to protect
economic growth."4 Indeed, recent economic studies indicate that the

1.
Nicholas Israel Nii-Trebi, Emerging and Neglected Infectious Diseases: Insights, Advances, and Challenges, BIOMED RES. INT'L, 2017, at 3; see generally Haidong
Wang et al., Global, Regional, and National Life Expectancy, All-cause Mortality, and
Cause-specific Mortality for 249 Causes of Death, 1980-2015: A Systematic Analysis for
the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015, 388 THE LANCET 1459 (2016).
2.
Nii-Trebi, supranote 1, at 1; Lawrence 0. Gostin, Why Rich Countries Should
Care About the World's Least Healthy People, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 89, 90 (2007).
3.
This Article uses the terms "Global North" and "Global South" as devices to
describe divisions that exist between the generally developed North and the generally
less developed South, but these characterizations overly simplify and paper over wide
disparities and diversity that exist in each category.
4.
Press Release, World Bank Group Launches Groundbreaking Financing Facility to Protect Poorest Countries against Pandemics, World Bank Press Release No.
2016/HDN/383
(May
21,
2016),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-re-
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annual cost of moderate to severe pandemics globally is roughly USD
570 billion.5 Moreover, threats to global public health pose significant
6
challenges for human security, which underscores the need for effective international regulation of pandemics.
The Ebola epidemic laid bare the weakness of global mechanisms
to respond adequately to public health crises. Ebola is an infectious
disease that manifests as a severe hemorrhagic fever, which is often
fatal without proper clinical care, such as providing fluids and maintaining blood pressure and oxygen levels. Because the early symptoms
resemble common diseases like malaria, many do not realize they are
infected and do not seek treatment at a hospital. The virus is spread in
humans through direct contact with broken skin, blood, bodily fluids,
7
or contaminated objects, and possibly through sexual contact. Between 2014 and 2015, West Africa had the largest outbreak of the disease in history.8 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that
this outbreak resulted in 28,616 cases of Ebola, and 11,310 deaths in
9
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea alone. Yet the comparatively trivial
number of cases that occurred in Europe (three) and the United States
(four)10 spurred international action and resulted in large-scale militarized responses. The full toll of the epidemic in West Africa is still being

lease/2016/05/2/world-bank-group-launces- groundbreaking-financing-facility-to -protect-poorest-countries-against-pandemics [https://perma.cc/C4MS-T75P] (archived Jan.
29, 2018). The WB's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility will create the world's first
insurance market for pandemic risk. Id.
Id.
5.
The concept of "human security" was first popularized by the United Nations
6.
Development Program in the early 1990s. Human security, like structural violence
moves away from conventional understandings of violence that are rooted primarily in
military aggression vis-A-vis other states, to one that focuses on the security of the individual. See U.N. TRUST FUND FOR Hum. SEC., HUMAN SECURITY IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT AND THE UNITED NATIONS TRUST FUND FOR
HUMAN SECURITY 5 (2009), http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.human-

security/files/human security-in theory-andpractice-english.pdf
[https://perma.cclUY43-9TTR] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).
See Ebola Virus Disease Transmission, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (July 22,
7.
[https://perma.cc/GB2D2015), http.//www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebolaltransmissionlindex.html
X6VT] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).
See Melissa Leach, The Ebola Crisis and Post-2015 Development, 27 J. INT'L
8.
DEV. 816, 816 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
See Ebola Outbreak 2014-2015, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO],
9.
http://who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en1 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/S4XMZV4A] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).
See 2014 Ebola Outbreak Case Counts, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
10.
(last uphttps://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebolaloutbreaks/2014-west-africalcase-counts.html
dated Apr. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cclN333-HAVC] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).
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uncovered-with recent reports showing that Ebola can linger in survivors' eyes causing painful disease, cataracts, and potential blindness
in the young and old."
This Article argues that the disproportionate distribution of infectious diseases like Ebola is a form of structural violence. Structural
violence is a term that is little explored in law but well developed by
scholars of development and global public health. Influential peace
scholar Johan Galtung argued that structural violence is unique in
that the violence is built into the structure and manifests as "unequal
power and consequently as unequal life chances."' 2 Paul Farmer's
work in the field of global public health has been helpful in elucidating
the concept of structural violence to the spread of epidemic diseases.' 3
This Article draws on the structural violence literature to reveal the
ways in which the international legal architecture facilitates the conditions for global health inequities, and in particular for infectious diseases to reach epidemic levels in the Global South. It demonstrates this
by utilizing a case study of the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. The Ebola epidemic reflects the unfortunate pattern where "the
fruits of medical and scientific advances are stockpiled for some and
denied to others."' 4
This Article addresses gaps in the literature by writing on an epidemic that has received scant attention in legal scholarship.' 5 In contrast, there has been much scholarship on other epidemics like
HIV/AIDS,1 6 Avian Flu, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS). Moreover, while the concept of structural violence is well established in the fields of development and health, most analyses elide
the role of the law in facilitating structural violence.' 7 This Article de-

11.
Denise Grady, Ebola'sLegacy: Children with Cataracts,N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/healthlebola-survivors-cataracts.html
[https://perma.cc/C22V-AYPG] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).
12.
Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167,
171 (1967).
13.
Paul Farmer et al., StructuralViolence and Clinical Medicine, 3 PUB. LIBR.
SCI. MED. 1686, 1686-91 (2006).
14.
Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power: Rethinking Health and Human Rights,
89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1486, 1488 (1999).
15.
See, e.g., Alison Agnew, A Combative Disease: The Ebola Epidemic in International Law, 39 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 97 (2016); J. Benton Heath, Global Emergency Power in the Age of Ebola, 57 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (2016).
16.
See, e.g., Emily Mendenhall & Shane Norris, When HIV is Ordinary and
Diabetes New: Remaking Suffering in a South African Township, 10 GLOBAL PUB.
HEALTH 449 (2015); Joia S. Mukherjee, Structural Violence, Poverty and the AIDS Pandemic, 50 DEV. 115 (2007); Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck, Beyond Sex: Legal Reform for
HIV/AIDS and Poverty Reduction, 15 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 781 (2008); Ayaz
Qureshi, StructuralViolence and the State: HIV and Labour Migrationfrom Pakistan to
the PersianGulf, 20 ANTHROPOLOGY & MED. 209 (2013).
17.
See generally Anne Wilkinson & Melissa Leach, Briefing: Ebola- Myths, Realities, and Structural Violence, 114 AFRICAN AFF. 136 (2014).
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parts from this practice and analyzes how the concept of structural violence can be operationalized in law. It demonstrates how international law and its various actors can facilitate structural violence
through analyzing the case study of the Ebola epidemic.
This Article considers the following issues: How is violence conceptualized internationally? When and why do states, international institutions, and other nonstate actors intervene in violent crises? What
should such intervention look like? This Article explores these lines of
inquiry by examining the global public health and international peace
and security regimes' responses to the Ebola epidemic. This Article has
many important contributions. First, the way international actors conceptualize crises needs to be expanded beyond merely addressing direct
physical violence internationally, but to also include remedying structural violence. Additionally, this Article finds that it is more useful to
theorize violence as a continuum-with the narrower end of the spectrum having the minimal conceptualization of violence (direct, physical
and psychological) and the other end of the spectrum having the
broader conceptualization of structural violence. Moreover, this study
of the Ebola epidemic indicates that the complicated relationship between infectious diseases and conflict warrants more robust attention
and resources. Finally, shared international responsibility norms
should be developed to respond to epidemics more effectively and to
assist in addressing the accountability gaps that arise in international
law with issues of structural violence.
This Article's analysis of the Ebola outbreak brings into stark focus the illusory international community. It is only when infectious
diseases like Ebola come perilously close to impacting countries in the
Global North that the international community and its various actors
muster the political will to act. The sad reality is that infectious diseases are left to run rampant for years in countries in the Global South
where disposable bodies of people of color are disproportionately affected. To be sure, there are a range of domestic factors from inadequate health policies, to corruption, to poor governance, amongst others that help to account for the current distribution of infectious
diseases, and there are undoubtedly variations within countries in the
Global South. Yet recognizing the existence of a state's duty to address
these failures does not preclude "a full investigation into the ways in
which international actors can be deeply implicated in the deprivation
suffered." 8
This Article is organized as follows: Part II provides the theoretical framework of structural violence, its contenders, and its use in various fields. Part II also provides the legal framework in international
law. Part III analyzes the ex ante factors that enabled structural vio-

Margo E. Salomon, From NIEO to NOW and the Unfinishable Story of Eco18.
nomic Justice, 62 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 31, 33 (2013).
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lence resulting in differential risks for infection and more adverse consequences from Ebola among the impacted countries-Guinea, Liberia,
and Sierra Leone. Part IV examines the international regimes for
health and security and demonstrates how these regimes facilitated
the conditions that worsened the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic and analyzes their responses to mitigate the harm. Part V discusses the theoretical and policy implications of this study, examining the limits of the
law governing international responsibility and the promise of international disaster law to respond to the challenges posed by diseases like
Ebola. The ease with which the Ebola virus spread makes this Article
timely, and of scholarly and policy interest, both nationally and globally.

II. THEORETICAL & LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Conceptual Framework:Structural Violence
Violence is traditionally conceptualized as direct physical or psychological violence. 19 Structural violence expands the orthodox view of
violence and is used to describe indirect violence that is not necessarily
tied to an identifiable human actor. 20 Structural violence complicates
conventional wisdom because it does not conceive of violence as spectacular, sensational, or hyper visible. 2 ' Galtung conceptualized structural violence in the field of peace-building as present "when human
beings are being influenced so that their actual .

.

. realizations are

below their potential realizations." 22 Galtung's conceptualization of
structural violence as social injustice is overly broad.
Paul Farmer improved upon the theory and applied it in the field
of global public health. He defined it as a "way of describing social arrangements that put individuals and populations in harm's way ....
The arrangements are structural because they are embedded in the
political and economic organization of [a society]; they are violent because they cause injury to people."2 3 Structural violence manifests in
global public health with the differential risks for infection and, among
those already infected, for adverse consequences including death, injury, and illness.2 4

19.
20.

Galtung, supra note 12, at 171.
Id.

21.

See ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR

13(2011).
22.
Galtung, supra note 12, at 168.
23.
Farmer et al., supra note 13, at 1686.
24.
See Paul Farmer, An Anthropology of Structural Violence, 45 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 305, 308 (2004).
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Structural violence is linked intimately with social inequality because "these conditions are the cause and result of . .. wars both declared and undeclared." 25 Structural violence manifests in many forms,
from gross inequality in the distribution of incomes to heavily skewed
literacy and education rates, or uneven distributions of epidemic
rates.2 6 And, because structural violence is often silent or otherwise
obscured, the object(s) of it as well as others may not perceive it as
violence at all, or presume that the status quo distribution of social,
27
economic, legal, and political structures is natural. Yet structural violence is not simply about the unequal distribution of resources, but
about the power to decide over the distribution of resources.
Scholars and practitioners use the concept of structural violence
28
in the areas of transitional justice and human rights, where much of
my prior writing has focused. It is also reflected in the work of 2004
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Wangari Maathai, whose Greenbelt Movement illustrated the connection between structural violence and environmental concerns. Additionally, it is commonly used in the work of
postcolonial scholars.2 9 There are a number of complementary and
30
competing frameworks to structural violence. For example, the notion of social (structural) determinants of health is an analogous concept to structural violence. 3 ' It refers to the complex and overlapping
social and economic structures that are responsible for most health inequities.32 Social (structural) determinants of health are shaped by the
distribution of money, power, and resources throughout local communities and nations globally.3 3 It is sometimes used in the public health
literature in lieu of structural violence.

Id. at 317.
25.
Galtung, supra note 12, at 177.
26.
Id. at 173.
27.
See, e.g., Louise Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Tran28.
sition, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. POL. 4, 48 n.22 (2007); Matthew Evans, Structural Violence,
Socioeconomic Rights and Transformative Justice, 15 J. HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (2016); Wendy
Lambourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence, 3 INT'L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28 (2009); Rama Mani, Dilemmas of Expanding TransitionalJustice or Forging the Nexus Between Transitional Justice and Development, 2 INT'L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253, 254-55 (2008).

29.

See, e.g., ACHILLE MBEMBE, ON THE POSTCOLONY: STUDIES ON THE HISTORY

OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2001).

30.

See NIXON, supra note 21, at 3.

See generally COMMISSION ON SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, WHO,
31.
THE GAP IN A GENERATION: HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL
http://www.who.int/socialdeterminants/re(2007),
HEALTH
OF
DETERMINANTS

(archived
[https://perma.cclW923-57NE]
sources/csdh framework-action_05_07.pdf
Jan. 29, 2018).
See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Meeting the Basic Survival Needs of the
32.
World's Least Healthy People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96
GEO. L. J. 331, 333 (2008).
See, e.g., Lant Pritchett & Lawrence H. Summers, Wealthier is Healthier,31
33.
J. HUM. RESOURCES 841 (1996); A. PROSS-USTON & C. CORVALAN, WHO, PREVENTING

2018J

EBOLA DOES NOT FALL FROM THE SKY

485

Some scholars have critiqued structural violence as a concept that
is too much of a black box. A few commentators label structural violence as a concept that "has no meaning" and a categorization of violence as simply what the "user of the term does not like."3 4 By calling

something "violent," the speaker implicitly seeks to designate the issue
with a certain importance that escalates it up the policy agenda. These
commentators admonish that all social ills need not be considered "violent" in order to recognize that they bring human suffering and need
to be eradicated. 35 Further, due to the limitations of international law
in addressing instances of mass direct violence, commentators may be
reluctant to embrace structural violence as a conceptual matter or otherwise. The fear is that an expanded conceptualization of violence
might detract attention from "real" violence and the much-needed resources and political will that are necessary to address it. Yet this presents a false dichotomy-by zeroing in on the narrow conceptualization
of violence, it is as if international coordination and action can only
galvanize towards one goal.
On the other hand, direct or physical violence corresponds with
intuitions around "what drama is." 36 While both direct and indirect vi-

olence involve harm to individuals, there is an assumption that direct
violence causes more suffering than structural violence.37 This dichotomy between direct and indirect violence reflects the bias and hierarchy internationally in which situations involving mass personal violence are crises that require urgent international action, while
structural violence becomes quotidian and less susceptible to redress.3 8
Structural violence as a frame assists with this unmasking and challenges the "normal state of affairs," which can produce death on a massive scale3 9 without an international response because visibility is otherwise obscured.

DISEASE THROUGH HEALTHY ENVIRONMENTS: TOwARDs AN ESTIMATE OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL BURDEN OF DISEASE (2006), http://www.who.int/quantifying-ehim-

pacts/publications/ prevdisexecsume.pdf [https://perma.cclH2HG-FZS6] (archived Feb.
8, 2008).
34.
Kjell Eide, Note on Galtung's Concept of "Violence," 8 J. PEACE RES. 71, 71
(1971); see also JOHN KEANE, REFLECTIONS OF VIOLENCE (1996); C.A.J. Coady, The Idea

of Violence, 3 J. APPLIED PHIL. 3, 4 (1986); Jean-Pierre Derriennic, Theory and Ideologies
of Violence, 9 J. PEACE RES. 361, 362 (1972); Claire Thomas, Why Don't We Talk about
'Violence" in InternationalRelations?, 37 REV. INT'L STUD. 1815, 1825 (2011).
35.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 34, at 1832.
36.
Galtung, supra note 12, at 171.
37.
Id.
38.
See Benjamin Authers & Hilary Charlesworth, InternationalHuman Rights
Law and the Language of Crisis 15 (Ctr. for Int'l Governance & Just., Working Paper
No. 18, 2013).
39.
See, e.g., AKHIL GUPTA, RED TAPE: BUREAUCRACY, STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE,
AND POVERTY IN INDIA 72 (2012).
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Further, how violence is theorized is important because it shapes
perceptions of the world and defines permissible and impermissible actions. The minimalist and the expansive understandings of violence
have different starting points-the former from the point of view of the
perpetrator (violence as intentional), and the latter from the point of
40
view of the victim (violence as violation). It may seem impossible to
bridge the gulf between the ideological and methodological approaches
to violence. This Article challenges this false dichotomy where violence
is either narrowly understood or broadly conceptualized. Instead, it argues that it is more illuminating to theorize violence as a continuumwith the narrower end of the spectrum having the minimal conceptualization of violence (direct, physical, and psychological) and the other
end of the spectrum having the broader conceptualization of structural
violence. Violence as a continuum facilitates coherence around the
range of human experience with violence-from the physical, to the
psychological, to symbolic, systemic, and structural. Theorizing violence as a continuum also allows consideration of accumulated actions
or inactions over time that produce culpable harm, as opposed to the
narrow conceptualization which conceives of violence as immediate, ev41
ident, and instantaneously registered. Further, violence as a continuum allows focus on the discursive and ideological processes by which
everyday violence is "normalized" and "naturalized" in public consciousness. 42 Viewing violence as a continuum does not lead to false
equivalencies between concepts that need to be differentiated.
Yet the narrower end of the spectrum comports with how many
conceptualize violence-where there is a clear causal connection be43
tween the subject, the object, and an action. While structural violence
does not ordinarily involve cognizable crimes, criminal law doctrine is
nonetheless helpful in better understanding the role of causation in
structural violence. In other words, one automatically wonders, if the
actor(s) refrained from action, would the result of structural violence
have occurred anyway? However, structural violence tends to involve
issues of overdetermination, or too much causation. By directing attention to the arrangements of and relationship between the parts or elements of a complex whole, structural violence contemplates as a foun44
dational matter that many causes can lead to the same outcome.

See Vittorio Bufacchi, Two Concepts of Violence, 3 POL. STUD. REV. 193, 196
40.
(2005).
Galtung, supra note 12, at 171.
41.
See, e.g., Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Dangerousand Endangered Youth: Social
42.
Structures and Determinantsof Violence, 1036 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 13-46 (2004).
Galtung, supra note 12, at 171.
43.
See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Moral Responsibilityof Public Officials: The
44.
Problem of Many Hands, 74 AM. POL. Sol. REV. 905 (1980).
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As such, structural violence as a concept requires the right inquiries about causation. Under traditional principles of criminal law, in the
face of instances of too much causation, different questions apply:
(1) whether the actor's actions were a substantial factor in producing the result, regardless of whether the outcome might have occurred anyway;
(2) whether the actor's actions hastened the result; or
(3) whether the actor's actions made survival less likely as a result.4 5

These inquiries are important because without examining them one
would tend to stop at the first-level question-whether the result
would have occurred but for the actor's actions. Yet situations of structural violence would not satisfy the first-level inquiry, because it appears that the outcome would have occurred regardless of the actor's
actions. Seemingly, the actions of the actor(s) made no difference to the
resulting structural violence, but this would be an incorrect conclusion
and elide the realities of situations of overdetermination. Because
structural violence is characterized by overdetermination, it is critical
to delve deeper than when ordinarily conceptualizing violence. Failure
to ask the right queries may lead to inaccuracies in identifying what
actor or actors are responsible for what. 46 Moreover, in determining
responsibility in criminal law-causation cannot be established if the
result is so remote that it makes holding the actor accountable illegitimate. 47 In other words, if the result was reasonably foreseeable to the
actor, then the actor's actions are considered sufficient to-establish causation, and it is considered fair to hold the actor accountable.
Criminal law doctrine is also helpful in better understanding what
to make of failures to act, when the result is structural violence. Under
general principles of criminal law, actors can directly perpetrate crimes
through affirmative voluntary acts or through not acting, when there
is a duty to do so.48 Similarly, structural violence can be perpetrated
through both commission and omission. Where structural violence occurs as the result of a failure to act, there is greater risk that the culpable harm occasioned by this failure will be misattributed or not attributed at all to the relevant actor(s) than in cases of direct violence.
The established criminal law rules for deciding omission liability are
similarly helpful in determining when an actor's failure to act can be

45.

JENS OHLIN, CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINE, APPLICATION, AND PRACTICE 192,

198 (2016).
46.
Cf. Andr6 Nollkaemper, PoliticalEconomy and the Responsibility of States:
The Problem of Many Hands in InternationalLaw, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A EURoPEAN PERSPECTIVE 278, 289-97 (Fabbricotti ed., 2016).
47.
OHLIN, supranote 45, at 209.
48.
Id. at 116-17.
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considered blameworthy for the resulting structural violence. Generally, in criminal law an actor is not required to act unless there is:
(1) some law that imposes a duty;
(2) a relationship status recognized by law as imposing a duty;
(3) a contractual duty;
(4) an actor who voluntarily assumes care secluding the person
from receiving care from a third party; or
49
(5) an actor who has created the harm in the first place.
These criminal law concepts are helpful for elucidating the forms of
structural violence that can occur via omission.
This Article employs these principles to reveal how certain international actors enabled structural violence with Ebola through omission. Further, criminal law doctrine provides important guidelines
about how the concept of structural violence can be operationalized in
law and may assist with showing causation for structural violence
more generally. However, this does not suggest that the appropriate
response to structural violence once attribution of responsibility has
occurred is to resort to criminal law or even tort law as a form of securing redress for structural violence internationally. This is because internationally few forums, if any, exist that would have both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over claims involving structural violence. As noted earlier, structural violence does not necessarily involve
cognizable crimes domestically or internationally. Accordingly, this Article prioritizes legal reform initiatives aimed at bettering the legal regimes that are charged with responding to the structural violence witnessed with epidemics. Additionally, this Article calls for an expansion
of the current frameworks for international responsibility and international disaster law in order to better address incidents of structural
violence seen with infectious diseases.
This Article utilizes the concept of structural violence as a literal
and rhetorical tool to highlight the harm caused by the operation of
international law and actors through action and inaction during the
West African Ebola outbreak. Structural violence as a framework in
this Article helps to draw attention to the arrangement of and relationship between the parts or elements of complex legal regimes. This
framework aids in foregrounding the background-the human-made
laws, policies, and conditions that gave rise to the Ebola epidemic. This
Article employs the concept to help to expose the fallacy of infectious
50
diseases as purely biological or naturally occurring events and in-

See People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129-30 (Mich. 1907) (describing
49.
the conditions under which a person is required to act).
See Susan Marks, Human Rights and the Bottom Billion, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS.
50.
L. REV. 37, 47 (2009).

2018J]

EBOLA DOES NOT FALL FROM THE SKY

489

stead highlights the lethal interaction between inequality and infectious diseases. Structural violence as a framework assists with identifying actors, actions, laws, policies, and omissions that might otherwise
be unacknowledged. In this way, the concept assists with apportioning
partial responsibility and undermining simplistic accounts where epidemics like Ebola just happen spontaneously, like manna from the sky,
or at most due to local backwardness. In sum, this subpart clarified the
framework of structural violence, discussed how it can be operationalized in law, and concluded that theorizing violence as a continuum better comports with people's lived experiences with violence.
B. Legal Framework: InternationalLaw
This Article uses the legal framework of international law because
international law increasingly addresses almost every type of human
activity, including those typically considered within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states-like health. States turn to international
law and institutions to achieve common aims, solve shared problems,
promote compliance with norms, reduce transaction costs, provide information, and coordinate orderly and peaceful dispute resolution.
Yet international law and its various participants are by no means
neutral. Instead, international law reflects important sites of power
contestation between the Global North and the Global South, among
other cleavages. 5 1 These cleavages have historical roots in patterns of
domination and exploitation by countries in the Global North: from the
plunder of resources, to slavery, to colonialism, and to neocolonialism. 52 Generally speaking, the Global South has had to function as "international law takers" on a range of social, political, and economic issues.5 3 These rules are backed by coercion from the ever-expanding
conditionalities imposed by international organizations (IOs), or from
the neglect of attention paid to social and economic realities in much of
the Global South by these institutions. 54 IOs and international law
more generally have functioned in a way that enables questions of social and economic inequality to be treated as solely a matter of concern
and responsibility of the territorial state, which has freed them from
having to mitigate the social and economic inequalities that result from
the functioning of international law, IOs, and state and nonstate actors.

51.
Notably, the least advantaged are not always located outside of the "developed" North. See, e.g., Volker Heins, Realizing Honneth: Redistribution,Recognition, and
Global Justice, 4 J. GLOBAL ETHICS 141, 146 (2008).
52.
See Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and InternationalLaw: The View
of an Insider-Outsider,45 VILL. L. REV. 841, 843-44 (2000).
53.
See generally Andrew Hurrell, Global Inequality and InternationalInstitutions, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 34 (2003).
54.
See id.
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Historically, the field of international law has deprioritized issues
55
of structural violence that underpin everyday life. Accordingly, economic and social rights, no matter how prolonged or systematic, recede
drably into the background.5 6 And, international actors view human
rights law violations affecting civil and political rights as more severe
and deserving of action. In part, this is due to the view that determining accountability for breaches of civil and political rights appears
more straightforward than for economic and social rights. And, the preoccupation with direct physical violence in international law restricts
it through its inattentiveness to persistent patterns of violations of economic, social, and cultural rights. While on occasion violations of these
rights are imbued with the rhetoric of crises (for example, in the case
of natural disasters, famine, or infectious diseases), the longer the sit57
uation persists, the more the sense of urgency dissipates. Accordingly, violations of economic and social rights are perceived as less sus58
This
ceptible to international coordination, action, and reform.
neglect of the importance of the economic and social sector has rendered already fragile countries in the Global South ill-equipped to deal
with pandemics, which was witnessed during the Ebola epidemic. However, highly infectious diseases do not respect borders and pose transnational challenges that require international cooperation and action.

III. WARS DECLARED AND UNDECLARED & THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC

The Ebola epidemic vividly illustrates the relationship between
war and disease. In some sense it is not coincidental that the epidemic
most impacted three post-conflict countries struggling to rebuild-Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. This Part demonstrates how the failure to conceptualize violence as a continuum may lead to haphazard
and incomplete post-conflict measures and interventions that may help
the sore, but do not heal the wounds. It examines how the international
community's focus on stemming "real" violence deprioritized addressing structural violence impacting the social and economic sectors. Postconflict interventions effectively ignored the decimated health care system left in the aftermath of years of neglect and conflict and created
fertile ground for the Ebola pandemic.

See Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline in Crisis, 65
55.
MODERN L. REV. 377, 391 (2002) ("One way forward is to refocus international law on
issues of structural justice that underpin everyday life.").
See Authers & Charlesworth, supra note 38, at 14.
56.
Id. at 17.
57.
Id. at 20.
58.
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A. Guinea, Liberia & Sierra Leone before Ebola
This subpart analyzes the ex ante factors that enabled structural
violence resulting in differential risks for infection from Ebola among
the impacted countries. Underdevelopment, conflict, and failures of
post-conflict reconstruction meant that Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Guinea were subject to more adverse consequences from structural violence during the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic.
1. Underdevelopment in the Sub-Region
While diseases can affect all countries, poorer countries tend to
suffer the greatest impact and are more vulnerable in cases of epidemic
diseases.5 9 The Ebola epidemic was able to wreak havoc in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in large part because these are some of the
poorest countries in the world, with Liberia ranking 175 out of 187
countries on the UN Development Program's Human Development Index, just in front of Sierra Leone at 177 and Guinea at 178.60 Historically, these countries have had their rich natural and human resources
extracted for the benefit of local elites and foreigners.6 1 This pattern of
exploitation left a lasting legacy on the sub-region. Some commentators
have painted this region of West Africa as remote or removed from the
world and the forces of globalization. 62 Yet this region has been very
connected: serving as a central place in the transatlantic slave trade,
part of the West African trading empires in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a source of supply for labor and commodities to
Britain, France, and American-Liberian powers. 63
Yet even after formal independence, similar patterns of exploitation persisted. For example, the dominance of extractive industries has
continued-with huge international mining corporations, oil interests,
and logging and other industries controlling significant sectors of the
economy. 64 The historical reliance on the extractive sector for economic
development led to wealth for a few individuals, while most were subjected to precarious lifestyles outside of the formal economy in overcrowded urban areas.65 For instance, despite being rich in natural and
mineral resources, Guinea has the eighth lowest gross national income

59.
See Puymbroeck, supra note 16, at 783.
60.
See Daniel G. Bausch & Lara Schwarz, Outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease in
Guinea: Where Ecology Meets Economy, 8 PUB. LIBR. Scl. NEGLECTED TROPICAL
DISEASES 4 (2014).
61.
See Wilkinson & Leach, supranote 17, at 137.
62.
See, e.g., Bausch & Schwarz, supra note 60.
63.
Leach, supra note 8, at 820.
64.

See id. at 820-21; see also INST. OF DEV. STUDIES, EBOLA AND EXTRACTIVE

INDUSTRY (2015).
65.
See Leach, supranote 8, at 822.
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per capita in the world, and poverty has been on the rise since 2003.66
Further, a survey in 2011 found large income gaps across all three
countries with the top 20 percent earning between 40 and 46 percent
of national income, and the bottom 20 percent earning between 20 and
22 percent. 67 Moreover, even though Liberia and Sierra Leone had
some of the highest growth rates globally, the vast majority of people's
68
lived experiences was and is defined by continued or growing poverty.
Further, Cold War politics meant that the Global North often dispensed international aid to support authoritarian regimes in the subregion from Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone, to Samuel K. Doe in Liberia, to Lansana Cont6 in Guinea. Stevens and the other leaders were
allowed to appropriate aid revenues and to undermine state services,
in return for allegiance. 6 9 The money lent to these corrupt and undemocratic regimes to build white-elephant infrastructure projects served
70
dubious purposes and had limited utility. The payments for these
projects, combined with the perpetually imbalanced trade patterns between the countries in the sub-region who relied on exporting extractive and agricultural goods and importing informational and industrial
goods from the Global North, resulted in a chronic cycle of unsustain71
able debt where countries borrowed to pay their debts.
Adding to this vulnerability in the region were reform policies of
international financial institutions, which undermined already compromised health systems.7 2 These reform policies affirmatively enabled
structural violence in the public health sector. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been active in West Africa for decades, with its
first loan in Liberia beginning in 1963.73 Similarly, since 1984 the IMF
74
has given consistent support to Sierra Leone and Guinea. The IMF

See Bausch & Schwarz, supra note 60, at 5.
66.
Bottom 20% Incomes, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
67.
SI.DST.FRST.20 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7WQA-QVLM] (archived
Jan. 29, 2018).
See INTL MONETARY FUND [IMF], WORLD EcONOMIC OUTLOOK: RECOVERY
68.
STRENGTHENS, REMAINS UNEVEN 69 (2014).

Dele Ogunmola, From Civil War to PoliticalParties:A Comparisonof Insur69.
gent Movements in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and C6te d'Ivoire, and Their MetamorphosisInto PoliticalParties, 14 GLOBAL J. OF HUM. Soc. SCI. 4, 5 (2014).
See Brook Baker, The Impact of the InternationalMonetary Fund's Macroe70.
conomic Policies on the AIDS Pandemic, 40 INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 347, 349 (2010).
Id.
71.
Id. at 347.
72.
30, 2013, IMF,
See LiberiaHistory of Lending Arrangements as of November
73.
6 00
&datelkey=
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberKeyl=
2013-11-30_(last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9QLJ-JXUY] (archived Jan. 29,
2018); see also Liberia: Transactions with the Fund from May 01, 1984 to August 31,
2017, IMF, http://www.imf.org/externallnp/fin/tadlextrans1.aspx?memberKeyl=600&
endDate=2017-08-31 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T7JB-WRRJ] (archived
Jan. 29, 2018).
See Guinea: Transactions with the Fund from May 01, 1984 to August8 31,
74.
2017, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tadlextrans1.aspx?memberKeyl=3 0&
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provided loans to encourage the "structural adjustment" of an economy
as a condition for extending and refinancing debt. The austerity
measures included cutting the budget deficit and improving the balance of payments. This was accomplished through budget ceilings,
wage caps, and/or reductions in wages in the public sector.7 5 These restrictions prioritized short-term economic objectives over longer-term
investments in public health, and the result predictably hollowed out
the flailing health sector.76 For example, an independent evaluation of
the IMF's loan programs surveyed twenty-nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa between 1999 and 2005 and found that 37 percent of all
annual aid increases were diverted to beefing up currency reserves,
with another 37 percent going to repay debts in line with the dictates
of structural adjustment-leaving only 27 percent for health and other
pressing developmental needs. 7 7

The IMF responded to concerns about its programs from actors
like the Jubilee Campaign, an international NGO network,7 8 and provided partial debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative.79 Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone all had unsustainable debt burdens and met the criteria for HIPC assistance.8 0 By
September 2012, all three countries had successfully completed
HIPC.81 This meant that they had established a good track record of

endDate=2017-08-31 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.ce/3P58-PNWF] (archived
Jan. 28, 2018); see also Sierra Leone: Transactions with the Fund from May 01, 1984 to
August 31, 2017, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tadlextransl.aspx?memberKeyl=850&endDate=2017-08-31 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/QL8AYF4U] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).
75.
Baker, supranote 70, at 347.
76.
Leach, supra note 8, at 823; see David Stuckler et al., The InternationalMonetary Fund's Effects on Global Health: Before and After the 2008 Financial Crisis, 39
INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 771 (2009); DAVID GOLDSBOROUGH, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., DOES
THE IMF CONSTRAIN HEALTH SPENDING IN POOR COUNTRIEs? EVIDENCE AND AN AGENDA

FOR ACTION (2007), http:///www.cgdev.org/doclJMF/IMF_Report.pdf
34US-2SVH] (archived Feb. 8, 2018).

[https://perma.cc/

77.
See generally JOANNE SALOP ET AL., INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, IMF, THE
IMF AND AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2007), https://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/

2007/ssaleng/pdf/report.pdf [https://perma.cclK2X9-UQLV]

(archived Jan. 29, 2018)

[hereinafter IMF 2007 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION].

78.

See, e.g., South-South Summit Declaration: Towards a Debt-Free Millen-

nium, WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (Nov. 21, 1999), https://www.oikoumene.org/ en/re-

sources/documents/wcc-programmes/public-witness-addressing-power-affirmingpeace/poverty-wealth-and-ecology/finance-speculation-debt/south-south-summit-declaration [https://perma.cc/P2XG-9MKM] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).
79.
Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor CountriesInitiative FactSheet,
IMF (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.imf.orglexternal/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm [https://perma.cc/
8WWK-TMLB] (archived Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter HIPC Fact Sheet].
80.
See id.
81.
See HIPC Initiative: Publications of Country Cases Considered Under the
Initiative, IMF, http://www.imf.org/externallnp/hipc/eng/pdf/hipecountries.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6YDV-RVTB] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).
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performance under IMF and WB sponsored programs, had satisfactorily implemented key reforms, had adopted a poverty reduction strategy paper, and had implemented its recommendations for at least one
year.8 2 Debt relief from HIPC is supposed to free up funds for countries
to use on social spending including health, with the money saved from
servicing debt.8 3 While the IMF and WB provided partial debt relief
under HIPC, full debt relief for most countries is still elusive because
creditor participation is voluntary and a number of smaller multilateral institutions and bilateral and commercial creditors have not delivered the anticipated relief. Furthermore, one-third of these creditors
84
have delivered no relief at all.

Due to the limitations with HIPC, the Group of Eight created the
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005 to allow for further
debt relief from the WB, the IMF, and the African Development Fund
85
on eligible debt for countries that successfully completed HIPC. In
order to qualify for this initiative, countries needed to have a per capita
income under USD 380 as well as have outstanding debt to these institutions in 2004.86 Countries also had to demonstrate success in the
IMF and WB's stipulated macroeconomic policies, implement a poverty
reduction strategy program, and successfully manage public expenditures.8 7 All three countries in the sub-region were eligible for the
MDRI.8 8 And, the IMF delivered to Liberia USD 172 million beyondHIPC debt relief on June 30, 2010.89
However, irrespective of the labeling that the IMF and the WB
used to describe their programs-from structural adjustment, to good
governance, or poverty reduction-the underlying logic and macroeco90
nomic policies remained the same. Although the IMF has attempted
to respond to the criticism leveled against it, it continues to prioritize
"macroeconomic stability above all else."91 Indeed, prior to the Ebola
outbreak, although all three countries had successfully met the IMF's

HIPC Fact Sheet, supra note 79.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
MultilateralDebt Relief Initiative Fact Sheet, IMF, https://www.imf.org/ex86.
ternal/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/M8P3-TD9E]
(archived Jan. 29, 2018).
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
90.

See Daniel W. Muriu, The Imperial-EmancipatoryParadoxof International

Human Rights: How Useful is the Right to Health in Sub-SaharanAfrica?, 9 INT'L COMM.
L. REV. 387, 401 (2007).
See Baker, supra note 70, at 354, 356.
91.
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macroeconomic policy prescriptions, they had all failed to meet targets
for social spending, including health.9 2
Moreover, to keep government spending low, the IMF placed limitations on public-sector wages, which meant that money to employ and
adequately remunerate doctors, nurses, and other health care professionals was limited.9 3 As health care employment opportunities lessened, health care quality and a capable health care workforce concomitantly decreased. Furthermore, depressed wages in the public health
system contributed to the brain-drain problem in the health sector
(where indigenous talent leaves for greener, more prosperous pastures). 94 For instance, even before the Ebola epidemic hit, in a survey
of health care workers for every thousand persons found, Guinea could
only count 0.1 doctors, Liberia 0.014, and Sierra Leone 0.022.95 In Sierra Leone, the structural adjustment policies of the IMF between 1995
and 1996 required the reduction of public employment, which resulted
in the retrenchment of 28 percent of governmental employees, 96 with
limits on wages continuing into the 2000s.9 7 This directly affected
health, as statistics provided by the WHO show a reduction of community health workers from 0.11 per 1,000 population in 2004 to 0.02 in
2008.98 While it is impossible to isolate how much of the lack of health
workers was caused by structural adjustment, it seems plausible that
these reform policies were at least a substantial factor in producing
this result.99 Accordingly, the effect of structural adjustment reforms

92.
IMF, Guinea:Letter of Intent, Memorandum ofEconomic and FinancialPolicies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding(Feb. 1, 2014); see also IMF, Liberia: Third Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for
Waiver of Nonobservanceof Performance Criterionand Modification of PerformanceCri-

teria, Country Report No. 14/197 (Jul. 11, 2014); IMF, Sierra Leone: FirstReview Under
the Extended Credit FacilityArrangement, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, and FinancingAssurances Review (Jun. 26, 2014).
93.

See IMF 2007 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION, supra note 77.

94.
See Karen McColl, Fighting the Brain Drain, 337 BRIT. MED. J. 958, 958
(2008); D. McCoy et al., Salaries and Incomes of Health Workers in sub-Saharan Africa,
371 LANCET 675 (2008); ERIC FRIEDMAN, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AN ACTION
PLAN TO PREVENT BRAIN DRAIN: BUILDING EQUITABLE HEALTH SYSTEMS IN AFRICA

(2004), http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00010242:21e6b22646
882263f8b7aa73a71c810c.pdf [https://perma.ccl8B73-R6N8] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).
95.
Global Health Observatory Data Repository: Density per 1,000, by country,
WHO (Feb. 2, 2017), http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.92100 [https://perma.cc/
249X-MNSG] (archived Feb. 8, 2018).
96.
IMF, Sierra Leone: Midterm Review Under the Second Annual Arrangement
Under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria, IMF Doc. No. EBS/96/155 (Sept. 25, 1996).
97.
IMF, Sierra Leone: 2006 Article IV Consultation, First Review Under the
Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Financing
Assurances Review, and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion
(Feb. 16, 2007).
98.
Alexander Kentikelenis et al., The InternationalMonetary Fund and the
Ebola Outbreak, 3 THE LANCET 69, 69 (2015).
99.
See McColl, supra note 94.
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were detrimental for the supply of health services-by insisting on cuts
in health spending to manage public expenditures.
Additionally, structural adjustment reforms also had a negative
impact on the demand for health services-by reducing household income, thus leaving people with less money for health. Due to the IMF's
and the WB's policies, public health was transformed into a commodity
and an individual responsibility. 00 For example, in Sierra Leone,
despite the government's introduction of a free health care initiative,
10 1
This
it continued to charge fees for services, which limited access.
fiscal
was influenced by the IMF's admonition to "carefully assess the
102
implications" of providing free health care services.
Indeed, studies have shown that the IMF's policies have slowed
down improvements in, or worsened, the health status of people in
countries implementing them. 0 3 The results elsewhere reportedly in04
clude increased incidences of infectious diseases like tuberculosis.1 it
is not a far stretch to see how the depletion of investment in health
services contributed towards higher incidences of Ebola in the sub-region. In Guinea, for example, beginning in the 2000s, the IMF pro05
The idea behind
moted fiscal and administrative decentralization.
decentralization is presumably to make care more responsive to local
demands; however, this move also makes it difficult to plan a coordi06
Five years after Guinea
nated response to an epidemic like Ebola.
complied with IMF dictates to transfer budgetary responsibilities from
10 7
an IMF mission to the
the central government to the local level,
country found governance problems, ineffective decentralization, and

Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 142.
100.
See generally AMNESTY INT'L, AT A CROSSROADS: SIERRA LEONE'S FREE
101.
HEALTHCARE POLIcY (2011).
IMF, Sierra Leone: Sixth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Ex102.
tended Credit Facility, IMF Country Report No. 10/176 (May 19, 2010).
See David Stuckler et al., InternationalMonetary Fund Programs and Tu103.
berculosis Outcomes in Post-Communist Countries, 5 PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED. 1079, 1086
(2008) (showing the connection between IMF programs and the worsening of tuberculosis
incidence, prevalence, and mortality rates).
Id.; see also IMF Casts Doubt on TB Study, IMF (July 23, 2008),
104.
723
3
08a
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/5 /sores
[https://perma.ccXG6C-94LH] (archived Jan. 30, 2018).
Kentikelenis et al., supra note 98.
105.
Id.
106.
See IMF, Guinea: Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty
107.
Reduction and Growth Facility, IMF Doc. No. EBS/01/57 (Apr. 18, 2001) (containing
Guinea's application for the arrangement); IMF, Guinea:Staff Report for the 2002Article
IV Consultation;First Review Under The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility;and
Requests for Waiver of Performance Criteria, Second-Year Program Under the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility, and for Additional Interim Assistance Under the Enhanced Initiativefor Heavily Indebted Poor Countries,IMF Doc. No. EBS/02/126 (Jul. 11,
2002) (detailing the results of Guinea's first review).
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deterioration of the quality of health-service delivery.10 8 While correlation does not equal causality, the analysis above indicates that the collective effects of the structural adjustment programs potentially made
survival from an epidemic disease in the impacted countries less likely.
During the midst of the Ebola crisis, the IMF belatedly recognized the
connection between its policies and the outbreak. IMF Director Christine Lagarde said at a meeting on the epidemic, "It is good to increase
the fiscal deficit when it's a matter of curing the people, of taking the
precautions to actually try to contain the disease. The IMF doesn't say
that very often."10 9
The analysis above briefly examines how underdevelopment
shaped the trajectory of the sub-region. The effects of historical exploitation, structural adjustment, and the debt crises are cumulative
causes, contributing substantially to the structural violence witnessed
during the Ebola epidemic. These factors aggravated the course of the
disease because they enabled the bankrupting of the public health sector, which lacked preparedness and robustness to cope with the Ebola
outbreak once it hit. Moreover, the resulting structural violence that
occurred was a foreseeable result of the actions of the international actors discussed above.
2. Conflict in the Sub-Region
Uneven development, the neglect of rural areas, and exclusionary
governance also created ripe conditions for conflict in all three countries and continued insecurity afterwards. The conflicts in Liberia and
Sierra Leone were interrelated wars resulting in over three hundred
10
thousand deaths (approximately fifty thousand in Sierra Leoneo
and
1
over two hundred fifty thousand in Liberia)," creating millions of refugees and internally displaced people.11 2 Liberia and Sierra Leone
quickly deteriorated as warlords throughout each country competed for
political power and economic resources, which decimated each country's flailing infrastructure and left each country without electricity,
sewage, or running water. The war in Sierra Leone is internationally

108.
IMF, Guinea:Staff report for the 2007Article IV Consultationand Requests
for Three- Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and for
Additional Interim Assistance Under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor CountriesInitiative, IMF Doc. No. EBS/07/140 (Dec. 7, 2007).
109.
Managing Director's Remarks on the Impact of Ebola, IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=3830643908001
[https://perma.cclK2K3-B35Q] (archived Jan. 20, 2018).
110.
John Bellows & Edward Miguel, War and Institutions: New Evidence from
SierraLeone, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 394, 394-99 (2006).
111.
Evelyne Schmid, Liberia's Truth Commission Report: Economic, Social, and
CulturalRights in TransitionalJustice, 24 FLETCHER J. HUM. SEC. 5, 9 (2009).
112.
Id.; see also Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalizationof Justice and the Special Court for SierraLeone's War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 55, 74 (2003).
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known for mass amputations and the forcible recruitment of children.
Other violations included forced cannibalism, sexual slavery, assault,
113
Similar
torture, rape, and looting as well as property destruction.
114
Liberia.
in
human rights violations were committed in the civil war
The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone had a spillover effect into
neighboring Guinea.1 1 5 The conflict in Guinea led to the death of over
one thousand Guineans and displacement of more than one hundred
thousand Guineans.116
In the aftermath of the conflicts in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone, many vital state institutions were nonexistent or significantly
weakened. For example, in 2008, the Index of State Weakness in the
Developing World (Index), which ranks all 141 developing countries
according to their performance in four key areas-economics, politics,
security, and social welfare-ranked Liberia ninth, Sierra Leone
thirteenth, and Guinea twenty-third (with a lower ranking
7
representing poorer performance)." The Index categorized all three
countries as "critically weak states," defined as those states "least capable of fulfilling most, if not all, of the four critical functions of gov18
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were ranked in the
ernment."s
bottom percentage of all states in providing social welfare to its
119
The Index considered
citizens, with Sierra Leone faring the worst.
0
six factors: child mortality,12 primary school completion, prevalence of
undernourishment, access to improved water sources, and improved
2
sanitation facilities, as well as life expectancy.' ' This provides some

113.

See SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, WITNESS TO TRUTH:

VOLUME THREE (2004), http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol3a/item/volume-three-a-chapter-four?category.id=3 [https://perma.cc/987X-UVWX] (archived Jan. 20, 2018).
114.

See TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N OF LIBERIA, CONSOLIDATED FINAL

REPORT 262 (2009), http://www.pul.org.1r/doc/trc-of-liberia-final-report-volume-ii.pdf
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sense of the level of comparative social deprivation in Guinea, Sierra
Leone, and Liberia prior to the Ebola outbreak.
This subpart briefly highlights how conflict exacerbated uneven
development in the sub-region. Direct physical violence was a substantial factor in producing the resulting structural violence in all three
countries. The legacies of wars both declared and undeclared resulted
in differential risks for infection in the impacted countries during the
Ebola epidemic, and among those already infected-harmful consequences including death, injury, and illness. The resulting structural
violence that occurred following the direct violence perpetrated by governmental and insurgent actors was reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, their actions are sufficient to establish causation, and it is fair
to hold them responsible. The subpart below analyzes how the failures
of post-conflict rebuilding compounded structural violence and vulnerability in the sub-region enabling Ebola's spread.
3. Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Sub-Region
Many post-conflict or transitional justice mechanisms are aimed
primarily at securing negative peace-the absence of violence and the
cessation of hostilities. 122 Yet the concept of positive peace encompasses not simply the removal of physical violence, but also the removal of structural violence,1 23 which enables consideration of the importance of both observable as well as latent violence.1 24 Further,
following a conflict there is a need to alleviate not only the injustices
caused by the conflict, but also the injustices that caused the conflict.1 25

And, in societies that have not experienced a recent history of conflict,
the insecurity and instability that may result from structural violence
merit close attention not only from a conflict prevention perspective,
but also from a social justice perspective. Yet much of the existing
scholarship and practice ignores the priorities and realities of postconflict societies when designing peace-building efforts.
This bias towards privileging direct violence occurred when UN
agencies, donor countries, and a number of international NGOs
spearheaded the post-conflict recovery process in the sub-region. For
example, post-conflict interventions focus on the Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants by
providing them with skills training, education, and financial incentives

122.
Galtung, supra note 12, at 183.
123.
Id.
124.
Id. at 172.
125.
See Jon Elster, Land Justice and Peace, in DISTRIBUTIvE JUSTICE IN
TRANSITIONS 16 (Morten Bergesmo et al. eds., 2010).
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126
The
to turn in their weapons to promote their return to civilian life.
Sierra
in
community
international
the
by
DDR programs supported
Leone provided a low salary, tool kits, and skills training to fifty-three
thousand ex-combatants. In Liberia, the programs disarmed approximately 103,101 ex-combatants and provided them with USD 300 as
well as some skills training. A survey conducted by the Human Rights
Center at the University of California at Berkeley in 2011 in Liberia
found that one of the top priorities for post-conflict reconstruction was
27
the health sector (42 percent).1 Yet recovery efforts did not properly
address this and other high-priority issues like lack of employment and
education.1 2 8 Akin to post-conflict reconstruction elsewhere, the
processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone focused on security sector
reform. This usually entails a mixture of recruiting, retraining, and
removing alleged human rights abusers from positions in the police
and the army. Moreover, following the transition from conflict, the focus was on accountability mechanisms like trials and truth commissions-both of which occurred in Sierra Leone, while Liberia had a
truth commission. The neglect of the importance of restructuring the
economic and social sectors in the sub-region rendered already fragile
countries ill-equipped to deal with the Ebola outbreak.
Indeed, focusing on direct violence and alleged perpetrators obscures the consequences of structural violence. This bias in turn may
29
Acresult in "catching the small fry and letting the big fish loose."'
to
led
a
continuum
as
violence
cordingly, the failure to conceptualize
physical
direct
on
focused
incomplete post-conflict measures primarily
violence; this omission exacerbated deeply rooted social inequalities
0
The emphasis on post-conflict
that pre-dated the conflicts.13
reconstruction presumed that the existing structures in society were
all equally worth rebuilding and had not contributed to
marginalization and disaffection of individuals and communities.
Additionally, the weight placed on rebuilding state institutions failed
to take into account that the "state" is an entity that was and continues
13 1
As a
to be distant from the lives of most people in the sub-region.
their
themselves,
on
depend
matter of survival, people have had to
communities, social networks, and other informal institutions to meet
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126.
ON THE GROUND: VICTIMS AND EX-COMBATANTS 159, 167 (Chandra Lekha Sriram et al.
eds., 2013).
See PATRICK VINCK ET AL., TALKING PEACE: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY
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128.
129.

See Leach, supra note 8, at 826.
Authers & Charlesworth, supra note 38, at 17.
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131.

See id. at 2.
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their daily needs. This is especially true for the younger members of
Liberian and Sierra Leonean societies whose formative development
took place during conflict. 132 Even after nominal peace, life remained
strikingly similar for many. Although violence decreased, people's
levels of insecurity and vulnerability persisted.
The failures of post-conflict reconstruction and the remoteness of
the state13 3 were especially evident in the health sector. Following the
implementation of structural adjustment programs, the decreased role
of the state in providing health services meant that NGOs overtook
this basic welfare function. 134 The beleaguered health systems enabled
by structural adjustment were even worse following the conflicts in the
region. A loose arrangement of international institutions led by the
United Nations Mission in Liberia and in Sierra Leone and composed
of international NGOs as well as donor countries became responsible
for managing the state and the health care sector.13 5 In many ways,
this network voluntarily assumed care and functioned as the de facto
government during post-conflict reconstruction. The accumulated actions and omissions of this coalition of international actors over time
facilitated structural violence seen during the Ebola outbreak. For example, in Liberia this coalition of actors was conflicted about maintaining long-term assistance to the public health sector.1 36 Instead, they
devised an ad hoc system, which consisted of a loose collection of clinics
and hospitals run primarily by international NGOs.13 7 The fragility of
this system of health care provision was apparent in 2007 when Doctors Without Borders left the country following the conflict. The lack of
the vital services they provided resulted in the closure of regional and
urban hospitals in Liberia. This, concomitant with the closure of thirty
World Vision clinics in the capital of Liberia, undermined the already
teetering system.' 3 8
The loose coalition called an emergency donor conference in 2007
to avert the burgeoning public health crisis. Donors agreed to provide
financing, human resources, and medical support to Liberia's health
sector through the Liberia Health Sector Pool Fund.' 3 9 Donors developed this fund to provide humanitarian health assistance. Under it,

132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Tsung-Ling Lee, Making InternationalHealth Regulations Work: Lessons
from the 2014 Ebola Outbreak, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 931, 972 (2016).
135.
See Sharon Abramowitz, How the Liberian Health Sector Became a Vector
for Ebola, Ebola in Perspective Series, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Oct. 7, 2014),
https://cultanth.org/fieldsights/598-how-the-liberian-health-sector-became-a-vector-forebola [https://perma.cc/2TPY-3ELE] (archived Jan. 20, 2018).
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
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the Liberian government and the international development actors determined national health priorities, and the Ministry of Health oversaw the numerous international NGOs operating in Liberia to provide
health services to the populace. Access to the funds was tied to mandatory health sector decentralization in order to promote post-conflict re140
Liberia implemented a number of
construction and democratization.
reforms under the Pool Fund, but the public health system remained
14 1
This did not stop an
"fragmented, underfunded and understaffed."
enormous bureaucracy from developing in the Ministry which
envisioned functions for various health sectors, which due to a lack of
resources existed on paper and on the doors of empty offices, but not in
reality.1 42 This facade of a health care system has been characterized
as a literal "application of 'structural violence"' with the state becoming
a "vector of disease." 14 3
The legacy of structural adjustment and post-conflict
reconstruction efforts combined to undermine state capacity and
reinforce the state's remoteness from the populace, by restricting the
144
space for the state to be involved in the provision of health services.
Consequently, aid organizations delivered more and more services to
the poor, since governments were shrinking their spending on public
services.' 45 This has meant that pre-epidemic contexts and now public
health centers and hospitals are regarded in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
46
Guinea as places to be avoided and even resisted.'
Yet the countries in the sub-region were viewed in many sectors
147
This was
as success stories for post-conflict reconstruction.
exemplified when two Liberian women won the Noble Peace Prize in
2011-President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and peace activist Leymah
Gbowee. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone avoided relapse into
widespread conflict and held peaceful elections, indicating that they
had turned the page. For example, Sierra Leone organized its own
election in 2012, and the United Nations successfully completed its
formal withdrawal of its peacekeeping operation from the country in
2014.148 Things improved in Guinea as well, especially foreign relations within the sub-region following the conflicts. Following several
coups and some instability, the political situation had since steadied.
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144.
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consequences of government underfunding of the healthcare system).
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147.
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamsil/background.html (last visited Feb.
8, 2018) [https://perma.cclFLK2-8376] (archived Jan. 21, 2018) (describing it as a "success story in peacekeeping").
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Despite these real improvements across the sub-region, Ebola
threatened to upend these gains.
The devastating results of the fractured system of health care delivery permitted by limited post-conflict reconstruction created conditions for structural violence and facilitated Ebola's spread. This potentially occurred through accelerating the harm caused by the Ebola
epidemic and/or reducing the likelihood of survival due to the lack of
resilient health systems. The counterfactual is a ready objection to the
arguments put forward in this Part, because one can never know what
would have happened if the coalition of international actors had not
engaged in post-conflict reconstruction in the sub-region, or if the IMF
and WB had not required structural adjustment reform policies. On
this view, it is possible that the resulting harm from the Ebola epidemic might have been much worse but for structural adjustment and
post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It is futile to attempt to disprove a
counterfactual given the impossibility of knowing what would occur in
this alternative universe. More importantly, it seems clear that narrow
post-conflict reconstruction, structural adjustment policies, and legacies of conflict were at least substantial factors in producing the resulting structural violence in all three countries: differing risks for infection in the impacted countries during the Ebola epidemic, and serious
adverse consequences among those already infected. Causation is established here because the structural violence that occurred during the
Ebola epidemic was not too accidental in its occurrence to have a just
bearing on the responsibility of the actors discussed above.
B. Guinea, Liberia & Sierra Leone in the Time of Ebola
The Ebola epidemic implicates a number of fundamental human
rights, including protections against the arbitrary deprivation of life1 49
and the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health under international human
rights law.1 5 0 A fundamental principle of economic social and cultural
rights is that states "undertake to take steps . . . to the maximum of its

available resources, with a view to achieving progressively" the right
to health as well as other economic, social, and cultural rights.15 ' This
includes the prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic diseases.1 52 Accordingly, under international law the primary responsibility for responding to pandemics lies with the affected state(s). This subpart analyzes the factors that influenced the disproportionate risks for

149.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
150.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12(1),
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151.
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infection from Ebola among the impacted countries. It analyzes the
vulnerabilities in the sub-region that permitted the epidemic to spread
so quickly, probes the connection between infectious disease and conflict, and analyzes how the lackluster local response facilitated structural violence.
1. Ebola's Trajectory in the Sub-Region
Ebola first appeared in 1976 in separate outbreaks in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Practitioners have
speculated that perhaps the virus was able to migrate to West Africa
from the DRC through fruit bats and was then transmitted to humans
through deforestation that led to increased hunting and consumption
of bats.1 53 This narrative has been challenged as inaccurate because it
pretends as if people have only recently encountered bats and have not
54
cohabitated with them for centuries in the forest.1 It is also problematic because it led to misguided admonitions to not consume "bush
meat," which denied an important source of protein to people in conditions of food scarcity. 155 Moreover, even if the initial event that led to
infection in humans was due to animal-human transmission, this is
largely irrelevant for addressing an epidemic that primarily spread
56
through human-to-human contact.1
Whatever the biological or ecological origin of the virus in West
Africa, it was the socio-political and legal landscape that influenced
whether the virus would lead to a couple of isolated cases or become a
full-scale outbreak.' 5 7 One of the reasons the epidemic was able to
spread so easily was because of the concentration of people in urban
areas due to decades of governmental neglect of rural areas as well as
58
Porous
displacement of many during the conflicts in the sub-region.'
borders between the three countries that had historically facilitated
the transfer of people and goods during the conflict years aided the
spread of arms, insurgents, and war economies; and during the Ebola
outbreak enabled the spread of disease and death. All three countries
closed their borders with each other attempting to contain the spread
of the disease.
During the epidemic, a pattern of transmission from rural to urban areas eased Ebola's spread. Emile Ouamouno ("Patient Zero") is a
two-year old child who got infected with a mysterious fever that spread
to his family members, a rural health facility, and then a health
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155.
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158.
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worker's funeral, and through related familial, social, and trading networks to the Liberian, Guinean, and Sierra Leonean borders.' 5 9 This
trajectory-where an infected person goes to an under-resourced
health facility without clean needles, a supply of gloves, or other necessities for successful treatment and containment of the disease, rendering both the patient and health care providers vulnerable and susceptible to transmission-resulted in the disease inevitably being
transmitted and the cycle repeated.1 60
It took three months for the mysterious fever found in Guinea in
December 2013 to be confirmed as Ebola in March of 2014.161 Between
March and May of 2014, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone identified
hundreds of Ebola cases. At the height of the epidemic, Sierra Leone
alone was experiencing 250 new cases per week and an epidemic doubling time of approximately thirty days.1 62 Remarkably, a 2015 Afrobarometer study indicated that 35.8 percent of Sierra Leoneans and 44.8
percent of Liberians surveyed knew a close friend or relative infected
with Ebola.1 63 Tragically, roughly the same percentage of respondents
knew someone who died of Ebola: in Sierra Leone approximately 33.4
percent, and in Liberia 40.8 percent. 164
Moreover, the collateral effects of Ebola were quite dramatic. Indeed, more than 60 percent of respondents to the Afrobarometer surveys in both Sierra Leone and Liberia indicated that they were unable
to work several or many times due to Ebola.165 Because.of Ebola, the
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166
tourist and service industries were also depressed in the sub-region.
Additionally, the disease reduced agricultural production, which contributed to food prices increasing by an estimated 24 percent across the
167
sub-region, leading to fears of malnutrition and famine.
Further, the Ebola epidemic attacked informal networks of care
by targeting women, who constituted up to 75 percent of those infected. 16 8 These women were the numerous mothers, sisters, daughters, grandmothers, aunts, wives, and girlfriends who bear primary responsibility for caregiving work. Informal systems of caregiving
became particularly salient when the local and international systems
of health care protection had receded or abandoned Ebola patients.
Women often functioned as the last line of care. But, the way the disease is transmitted threatened this, which meant that physical touch
to comfort and show concern and affection was also off-limits. Ebola
educational campaigns stressed this-"no hugging, no handshakes, no
caring for the ill, and no handling of the dead" in preparation for burials. 16 9 Markets and social places were deserted as government restrictions and fears about congregating in public led people to avoid
many everyday interactions. 170 The Afrobarometer survey results indicate that more than 60 percent of respondents in Sierra Leone were
unable to attend social gatherings several or many times due to
Ebola. 17 1 As such, the disease impacted much more than physical bodies, striking also at the fabric of social life instilling fear around everything from making love to shaking hands.1 72 In this way, Ebola not only
threatened communities of care, but what it means to be human-challenging how people greet and interact with strangers and loved ones
and what it means to die with dignity and respect.
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2. Post-Conflict Legacies & the Ebola Epidemic
Statistically, disease is a more formidable and deadly opponent
than war. 173 Like war, disease has the ability to completely upend governments by creating power vacuums, reducing life expectancy and
concomitantly the available productive workforce and capacity, which
impedes economic growth, threatens food security, and erodes confidence in government institutions. 174 Naturally, the metaphor of conflict was employed to describe the fight against Ebola and legacies of
violence influenced governmental responses. 175 Countries declared
themselves "at war with an enemy we don't see," conjuring up images
of the "invisible rebel." 176 Others drew parallels between how earlier
insurgencies had come from the border areas to threaten urban areas,
and how Ebola's spread in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone followed
this same trend. 17 7 Resistance strategies were also eerily similar with
some Liberian women gathering in all white at the same location they
used during the conflict to protest and pray for peace. But this time
they focused their prayers on divine intervention to overcome Ebola. 17 8
Additionally, Ebola survivors faced several of the same re-integration
issues as former combatants, due to the myths, stigma, and social ostracization that accompanied the disease. 179 Both the former combatant and the Ebola survivor had had contact with the unknown and instilled fear and anxiety in people.1 80
The governments in the sub-region resorted to war-like and authoritarian tactics including aggressive policing, closed borders, and
restrictions on people's movement. 1 8' The security forces in Liberia
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(Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/29/
fighting-ebola-liberias-invisible-rebel/?utm-term=.ede30926db71
[https://perma.cc/CD93-2K8F] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
177.

See IDS, RETURN OF THE REBEL, supra note 130, at 1-2.

178.

See Breen, supra note 176.

179.

See IDS, RETURN OF THE REBEL, supra note 130, at 3.

180.
See id.
181.
See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil Jr., Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century, Countries Cordon off Ebola Racked Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.ny2

times.com/ 014/08/13/science/using-a-tactic-unseen-in-a-century-countries-cordon-off-

ebola-racked-areas.html [https://perma.cc/4KUA-25LH] (archived Jan. 21, 2018) (noting
that West African governments implemented "cordon sanitaire" which has not been used
in a century and involves the government drawing a line around the quarantined area
where no one is allowed to cross); Adam Nossiter, Lockdown Begins in Sierra Leone to
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even fired live rounds at people who were attempting to remove the
barricades from their quarantine in one of Liberia's largest slum areas. 182 This use of force gave the impression that the Liberian government was attacking poor urban dwellers and not the virus. Governments that have been perceived and experienced by their publics as
detached for decades were now supposed to be responsible for the provision of care and relief.18 3 The governments predictably resorted to
authoritarian techniques. For example, Sierra Leone's army reportedly
cordoned off rural areas where Ebola was present, indiscriminately
trapping infected and uninfected individuals in and limiting their freedom of movement. 184 After the looting of a medical ward in Liberia, the
government instructed the armed forces to "shoot on sight" anyone en85
tering the country from Sierra Leone without proper documentation.'
That these countries relied heavily on military and policing when faced
with Ebola is not shocking considering that these institutions were the
only relatively strong ones following limited post-conflict reconstruction.
3. Ineffectual Local Responses to Ebola
The epidemic overwhelmed the governments in the sub-region
and re-exposed the fragility of the state apparatus. In part, this was
because post-conflict reconstruction efforts were focused on rebuilding,
retraining, and integrating disparate groups into the police and the
military with little to no investment in the health sector. All three
countries imposed a state of public emergency that combined impacted
millions of people.1 86 Sierra Leone declared a national "stay at home
day" and ordered a three-day lockdown during which time the populace
was to remain indoors, while outreach workers attempted to identify
cases, engage in public sensitization, and assist with the removal of
bodies of Ebola victims.18 7 In Sierra Leone, the Afrobarometer survey
results indicate that 50.6 percent of respondents were unable to attend
88
Similarly, Guinea closed all schools
school many times due to Ebola.s
and universities for an indefinite period of time to attempt to halt the
89
transmission of the virus.'

The governments' conduct in attempting to eradicate Ebola engendered and reinforced deep public suspicion and mistrust of the
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state. For example, many Liberians believed that the Ebola virus was
a new method the government had concocted to derive money from its
international backers.' 90 Early denials of Ebola in Sierra Leone and
Guinea were similarly influenced by fears that the government was
trying to rid itself of an opposition stronghold through depopulation of
particular regions.'1 9 In Guinea, residents' fear was also partially informed by their experience with noninclusive state socialism under
post-independence leader Sekou Tour.' 9 2 This experience led them to
believe that Ebola was a government effort to take over their markets.1 93 Others in Guinea suspected that Ebola was designed by white
mining interests in order to be able to exploit iron ore deposits.1 94 Similar to the commonplace myth with HIV/AIDS, many across the subregion also suspected that Ebola was disseminated by Whites in order
to kill off Blacks. 95 These rumors, political myths, and conspiracy theories helped to fill the void and make sense of the mysterious phenomena of Ebola. It would be too simplistic to dismiss these perceptions as
mere superstition or ignorance. These sentiments stem from people's
experience of structural violence and perceptions of state and foreign
actors as "alien, oppressive, and self-serving."1 96 This alien-ness was
literally reinforced by the "space-suit like" protective gear donned by
Ebola outbreak teams. 9 7
Individual and community-level responses to Ebola cannot be divorced from people's lived realities. For instance, in Liberia, an uncle
of a family of young orphans explained that the mother of the children
contracted Ebola from an aunt who had died, and that the family had
called the Ministry of Health's Ebola hotline when the mother began
showing symptoms. 9 8 No one came from the treatment unit, but a burial team came to take her body away when she died. Subsequently, the
children's father also became ill with Ebola, and the family again called
the hotline for days without response.' 9 9 When the children's father
died, a burial team came a couple of days later to retrieve the body.
This led the uncle to chase away a health care worker when the children began showing early signs of Ebola and to exclaim that the Ministry of Health appears to care "more for the dead than the living."2 00

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 144.
Id.; Faul, supra note 159.
See Leach, supra note 8, at 827.
Id.
Faul, supranote 159.
Id.
Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 144.
Leach, supranote 8, at 821.
See Abramowitz, supranote 135.
Id.
Id.
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Ebola exposed the fagade of the formal health system and
demonstrated quite vividly how much actual health care provision
depends on the informal system. This was particularly true for those
living in rural areas, as the distance to get to a health facility is daunting-especially due to poor roads that are often impassible during the
20 1
rainy season, as well as the need to arrange for private transport.
Consequently, some people rely on informal drug suppliers and
202
traditional healers because of the paucity of clinics and pharmacies.
The Afrobarometer survey confirms this, with approximately 20-30
percent of respondents in Sierra Leone and Liberia, respectively, finding traditional medicine practitioners to be somewhat to very effective
in providing care for Ebola victims.20 3 Reliance on the informal system
is sensible in a context where it is common practice for government
officials and the well-to-do to go overseas to seek medical care in Ghana
204
This tendency
or South Africa, or in Europe and the United States.
increased during the outbreak, with many sending their families
abroad if not leaving themselves.
The informal health system had more legitimacy than the formal
health system in part because the latter had proved to be deficient in
a myriad of ways. Treatment facilities did not have enough beds or staff
20 5
Additionally, many clinics
to care for the sick across the sub-region.
were forced to close because they became sites of transmission and
death as opposed to places to receive care. This occurred due to the
formal health sector's general lack of personal protective equipment as
206
For example, one of the hospitals
well as "staff, systems and stuff."
responsible for the provision of care to 330,000 people in Liberia was
207
The
forced to close due to the lack of personnel to run the hospital.
Afrobarometer survey results demonstrate that more than 60 percent
of respondents in Liberia and Sierra Leone believed they were unable
to get medical care for other health problems several or many times
due to Ebola. 208 This meant that those that were suffering from more
prevalent and common illnesses like malaria, typhoid, or pneumonia

See Wilkinson & Leach, supranote 17, at 143.
201.
See IDS, RETURN OF THE REBEL, supra note 130, at 2.
202.
See Afrobarometer 2015 Survey Results, supranote 163, at Q85c-SRL (11.5%
203.
very effective and 7.8% somewhat effective for Sierra Leone); see also id. at Q84d-Lib
(10.1% very effective and 19.6 somewhat effective for Liberia).
See Breen, supra note 176 ("Citizens know that government officials often
204.
leave Liberia for the United States or Europe to seek medical attention.").
See Konye Obaji Ori, Liberia: Ebola Threatens Statehood Success, Post-Civil
205.
War, THE AFR. REP. (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.theafricareport.com/West-Africalliberia[https://perma.cclHB2G-QVT2]
ebola-threatens-statehood-success-post-civil-war.html
(archived Jan. 21, 2018).
Farmer & Mukherjee, supra note 168.
206.
Hodge et al., supra note 184, at 358.
207.
See Afrobarometer 2015 Survey Results, supra note 163, at Q84d-SRL; id. at
208.
Q84d-Lib.
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were dying in even more alarming numbers because they were unable
to receive proper care.20 9 Likewise, gains that were made reducing maternal deaths were being reversed. 2 10
Thus, instead of the negative individual and community reaction
towards health care workers and centers symbolizing a rejection of
Western medicine, 211 a more nuanced analysis would situate this backlash as a form of resistance against structural violence after decades of
neglect and exploitation. For example, allegations of corruption that
led to the suspension of donor funds to the Ministry of Health and
Sanitation in Sierra Leone in 2013 reinforced earlier worries of
governmental malfeasance. 212 Fears of corruption in Sierra Leone also
led international accounting firm KPMG to withdraw from the Ebola
Fund due to questionable management practices.2 13 These fears were
not unfounded, with recent audits indicating that fraud by Red Cross
workers and others wasted at least USD 6 million meant to fight Ebola
in the sub-region. 214
Accordingly, health care centers were increasingly viewed with
suspicion, because people were accustomed to fending for themselves
and were skeptical of their governments' newfound care and concern.2 15 The Afrobarometer survey results corroborate this, finding
that the perceived effectiveness of local private or public hospitals and
clinics provision of care to Ebola victims is dismal when contrasted
with the perceived effectiveness of international organizations. 216

209.
Farmer & Mukherjee, supra note 168.
210.
Id.
211.
See, e.g., Rukmini Callimachi, Fear of Ebola Drives Mob to Kill Officials in
Guinea, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/world/africalfear-of-ebola-drives-mob-to-kill-officials-in-guinea. html
[https://perma.cc/3289PS3W] (archived Jan. 21, 2018); Emma Farge, Exclusive: Guinea Says Ebola Patients
Sent Home After Botched Blood Tests, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-guinea-exclusive-idUSKBNOLY2OY20150302
[https://perma.cc/ZDS7-6R8M] (archived Jan. 21, 2018) (discussing an incident in
Guinea when workers in a facility run by Doctors Without Borders, accidentally put
blood samples in the wrong test tubes, leading to the release of at least four patients who
tested positive for Ebola and the death of two of these individuals).
212.
See GAVI Review of Health System Strengthening in Sierra Leone, GAVI
VACCINE

ALLIANCE

(Apr.

11,

2013),

http://www.gavi.org/library/news/state-

ments/2013/gavi-review-of-health-system-strengthening-in-sierra-leone/
[https://perma.cclH7BJ-GLED] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
213.
Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 144.
214.
See IFRC Statement on Fraud in Ebola Operations, INT'L FED'N OF THE RED
CROSS (Oct. 20, 2017), http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/ifrc-statement-fraud-ebola-operations/
[https://perma.cc/P3DF-EQYE] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
215.
See, e.g., Breen, supranote 176.
216.
Compare Afrobarometer 2015 Survey Results, supra note 163, at Q85a-SRL
(39.6% of Sierra Leonean respondents noted that private hospitals and clinics were not
at all effective in providing care to Ebola victims), and id. at Q85b-Lib (33.4% of Liberian
respondents noted that public hospitals and clinics were not very effective and 32.7%
thought they were only somewhat effective in providing care to Ebola victims), with id.
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These issues conspired to make the populace view their "health
system" with derision due either to peoples' experience with it or
inability to access it because of economic, logistical, or other
constraints. 21 7 Sadly, only a little more than a third of respondents surveyed by the Afrobarometer in Sierra Leone were very confident that
2 18
their government was prepared for a future Ebola outbreak.
The synopsis above is necessary to begin to understand the subregion's extreme vulnerability to crises and why the Ebola epidemic
had such devastating consequences in this part of the world. This subpart analyzed how the ineffectual local governmental responses to
Ebola resulted in structural violence in all three countries, exacerbating the adverse consequences of the disease. It seems that the governments' affirmative conduct was a substantial factor in producing the
resulting structural violence in all three countries, the disproportionate risks for infection during the Ebola epidemic, and the associated
harms. Moreover, the resulting structural violence that occurred following the governmental responses to Ebola was not so remote to render it unforeseeable to governmental actors. Accordingly, it is fair under the circumstances to hold governmental actors responsible for
contributing to structural violence committed during the Ebola epidemic.
But, as other scholars have eloquently put it, "[v]ulnerabilities do
not just fall from the sky." 2 19 While undeniably the spread of the Ebola
epidemic is due to a combination of domestic factors, the tendency has
been to focus almost exclusively on local actors and factors as a way to
220
Such
distance, differentiate, and other the spread of the disease.
systemanalyses serve to obscure the functioning of the international
as if no institutions or other actors influenced this result through actions, decision making, laws, policies, and omissions. The next Part
turns to this unmasking.

at Q85e-SRL (66.9% of Sierra Leonean respondents noted that international organizations were very effective in providing care to Ebola victims).
See Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 142-43.
217.
Afrobarometer 2015 Survey Results, supra note 163, at Q86f-SRL.
218.
Jesse Ribot, Vulnerability Does Not Just Fall From the Sky: Toward Multi219.
Scale Pro-PoorClimate Policy, in SOcIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: EQUITY AND
VULNERABILITY IN A WARMING WORLD 47 (Robin Mearns & Andrew Norton eds., 2009).

See Obijiofor Aginam, InternationalLaw, HIV/AIDS, and Human Rights in
220.
Africa: A Post-ColonialDiscourse, 100 AM. SOc'Y INT'LL. 350, 351 (2006) (discussing the
rhetoric on HIV/AIDS as a unique problem to "'savage African cultures that encourage
promiscuity, male domination, polygamous relationships, infidelity, and wife inheritance").
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR HEALTH AND SECURITY & THE
SPREAD OF EBOLA

This Part draws attention to international legal and institutional
frameworks that influence and sustain structural violence. While these
international processes might be done without malicious design, it is
important to analyze the role of international law to counteract the
sense that the way the Ebola epidemic unfolded is demonstrative of
how bad things "just happen." 221 Failure to interrogate both the role of
local and international action and inaction relegates us to an unsatisfactory world in which diseases like Ebola cannot be overcome or defled-like gravity.
This Part focuses on the international regimes for health and security because these regimes' mandates charge them with responding
to the Ebola epidemic in varying ways. The WHO's primary role is to
direct and coordinate international health within the United Nations'
system, while the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) primary
responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security.
Given their mandates, this Part analyzes what obligations these regimes have to respond to the Ebola epidemic, whether these regimes
discharged their responsibilities during the epidemic, and, if they
failed to do so, whether the failure to act was a substantial factor and/or
an accelerating factor in the resulting structural violence that occurred. Additionally, this Part considers whether it is fair under the
circumstances to hold the actors within these regimes responsible for
contributing to structural violence. Finally, this Part analyzes whether
their responses ex post facto will positively impact the likelihood of survival from other epidemics.
A. InternationalHealth & the Regulation of Highly Infectious
Diseases like Ebola
The ineffectual role played by the WHO in regulating infectious
diseases has been well documented elsewhere. 222 For example, the devastating toll of HIV/AIDS, one of the worst pandemics in history,
threatened to eclipse the role of the WHO.223 Yet following the WHO's
successful fight against SARS in 2003, members empowered the organization to declare and manage global public health emergencies. This

221.
See Marks, supranote 50, at 48 (advocating treating phenomena like famine
and poverty as historical processes rather than objects).
222.
See, e.g., David Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global
Health Security: The New InternationalHealth Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 325
(2005) (analyzing the International Health Regulations [IHRs]).
223.
See Lindsay Wiley, Moving Global Health Law Upstream: A CriticalAppraisalof Global Health Law as a Tool for HealthAdaption to Climate Change, 22 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 462 (2010) (recounting the history of the WHO and the IHRs).
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subpart analyzes the emergency powers granted to the WHO under the
International Health Regulations (IHRs) in 2005224 and examines the
WHO's failure to adequately manage the Ebola crisis and to discharge
its responsibilities.
1. The WHO's Emergency Powers
The World Health Assembly is the governing body for the WHO
225
However, the WHO has made
and has significant regulatory powers.
226
For example, in 1951 the
limited use of its constitutional powers.
International Sanitary Regulations were enacted, which were renamed
the International Health Regulations (IHRs) in 1969 and revised in
2005.227 The IHRs were aimed primarily at controlling communicable
diseases, although the 2005 revisions expanded the scope of health issues covered.2 2 8 The basic premise of the system worked via notification requirements which would then trigger an international response
that imposed travel and trade restrictions in order to control the spread
22 9
of certain named diseases like cholera, yellow fever, and the plague.
While the list of diseases expanded over the years, the IHRs became
mainly superfluous. 23 0 Scholars have demonstrated how increasing
flows of trade and travel made quarantine and isolation provisions obsolete, and medical advances like antibiotics and vaccinations required
a drastically different approach than those initially envisioned by the
IHRs. 231
The IHRs of 2005 empower the Director General of the WHO Secretariat, in conjunction with a committee of mostly medical experts, to
declare an international state of emergency as well as provide tempo232
They
rary recommendations once the emergency has been declared.
also require the Director General to consult with the committee of experts before deciding whether to terminate an emergency or to modify

See generally WHO, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (3rd ed. 2005),
224.
2 46
107/1/9789241580496-eng.pdf?ua=1
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/
[https://perma.cc/3BCX-XMQS] (archived Jan. 16, 2018) [hereinafter IHRs 2005] (containing the entire 2005 record of International Health Regulations).
See, e.g., WHO Constitution arts. 19, 21, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185
225.
[hereinafter WHO Constitution] (stating that the Health Assembly has the authority to
adopt conventions, agreements, and regulations).
See David Fidler, InternationalLaw and Global Public Health, 48 KAN. L.
226.
REV. 1, 2 (1999) (describing the genesis of the WHO Constitution); see also The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166.
See Wiley, supra note 223, at 461.
227.
See id. (discussing how the IHRs also cover chemical and radio-nuclear is228.
sues).
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id. at 462 (describing the developments of the IHRs over time).
Id.
Id.
See IHRs 2005, supra note 224, arts. 12-17, 48-49.
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a previously issued recommendation.2 3 3 Under the IHRs, all recommendations are to sunset after three months, subject to extensions that
cannot continue over two years. 234 If the Director General wants to issue standing recommendations, they must be approved by a plenary
body of the WHO. 235 The WHO's emergency response is subject to review by an expert committee that can issue a non-binding report. 236
The procedures and framework that are set out in the IHRs provide only the broad parameters for emergency decision making, and
they do not determine when an emergency should be declared. Moreover, the concept of crisis is an inherently political and legal construct
that allows for the justification of extraordinary power. While the WHO
is primarily controlled by physicians, scientists, public health specialists, and other experts who tend to emphasize a scientific or medical
approach to addressing public health emergencies, tensions inevitably
arise because of the essentially legal and political nature of emergencies.2 37 The WHO is a secretariat that is responsive to member states
and specifically the ministries of health of different countries, which
often have varying interests and priorities. 238 And powerful states can
always exert influence because they are more likely to have nationals
who are WHO experts and personnel. 239
The IHRs of 2005 define a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) broadly as "an extraordinary event, which is
determined . . . (i) to constitute a public health risk to other States
through the international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response." 240 Under the regulations,
the WHO can make wide-ranging recommendations concerning travel
advice, restrictions on travel in certain regions, quarantines, customs
restrictions, vaccination protocols, as well as measures relating to food
safety. 24 1 While these recommendations are non-binding, 242 they serve
as a baseline for measuring states' responses to PHEICs to the extent
they deviate above the recommended actions or below the recommended actions. 243 The main critique of the WHO during the Ebola cri-

233.
Id. art. 48(1).
234.
Id. art. 15(3).
235.
Id. arts. 16, 53.
236.
Id. arts. 50-53.
237.
See, e.g., Asher, supra note 173, at 148.
238.
Notably, one of the experts on the Emergency Committee must be nominated by the state giving rise to the emergency. IHRs 2005, supra note 224, art. 48(2).
239.
See Heath, supra note 15, at 11 ("[T]he relative autonomy of international
bureaucracies may create inequality among states (or among other relevant actors), insofar as some states have greater capacity to influence experts.").
240.
IHRs 2005, supra note 224, art. 1.
241.
Id. arts. 15, 18(1).
242.
Id. art. 1.
243.
See Heath, supra note 15, at 23-24.
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sis surrounded the organization's delayed decision making in activating its emergency powers. The subpart below explores the WHO's lackluster response to Ebola and failure to adequately manage relief efforts.
2. The WHO's Failure to Manage the Ebola Epidemic
a. Declaring an Emergency
Ebola was a litmus test for the WHO's newly minted emergency
powers. In 1995, when the Ebola outbreak in the DRC occurred, it was
not a designated disease for reporting purposes under the then governing IHRs. 2 44 During the DRC outbreak, the police blocked the road
leading to the capital city, resulting in the healthy dying along with
those stricken by Ebola. 245 Some commentators have noted that the
fear and the desire to control an unknown disease concomitant with
the lack of necessary legal structures and policies in place potentially
contributed to a greater loss of life than was necessary. 2 46 Tragically,
almost ten years later a similar pattern of structural violence occurred
in West Africa.
Poor communications and complacency within the organization
resulted in the WHO not convening a regional meeting on the epidemic
247
The outbreak in West Africa
until three months into the outbreak.
emerged in December 2013,248 and Doctors Without Borders had been
sounding the alarm since March of 2014 that the scale of the outbreak
249
Yet it was not until August of
in West Africa was "unprecedented."
2014 that the WHO declared Ebola a PHEIC under the IHRs of 2005.
Moreover, it was only at this point that the WHO unveiled a framework
2 50
for attempting to contain the outbreak.
The WHO missed the opportunity to quickly contain Ebola and
bring the outbreak under control. It initially determined that from a

See World Health Assembly, International Health Regulations, adopted
244.
July 25, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 3003 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1971) (defining diseases subject
to the IHRs as "cholera, including cholera due to the El Tor vibrio, plague, smallpox,
including variola minor (alastrim), and yellow fever").
TRIB.
Paul Salopek, Ghastly Ebola Unlikely to be Last of its Kind, CHI.
245.
3
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-060826salopek -story2000),
18,
(Jan.
story.html [https://perma.cc/Q7UJ-75XC] (archived Jan. 18, 2018).
See Asher, supra note 173, at 155.
246.
Leach, supra note 8, at 824.
247.
Imogen Foulkes, WHO Under Fire Over Response to Epidemic, BBC NEWS
248.
[https://perma.cc/
(Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.bbc.cominews/world-europe-29691044
YGA3-K488] (archived Jan. 18, 2018).
See, e.g., Ebola outbreak in Guinea unprecedented- MSF, BBC NEWS
249.
[https://perma.cc/
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.comlnews/world-africa-26825869
VN9J-V7J6] (archived Jan. 18, 2018).
Leach, supra note 8, at 824.
250.
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numbers perspective, the Ebola outbreak did not rise to the level of
urgency that warranted declaring a PHEIC, but this approach failed to
take account of the unique characteristics of the outbreak in the subregion. 25 1 The Ebola outbreak in West Africa did not occur in a remote
area; so for the first time the disease reached a big urban area-Conakry, the capital city of Guinea. 252 Also, because suspected cases were
emerging along the border areas with Sierra Leone and Liberia, it
would mean having to coordinate the response of three different administrations under circumstances where no government would have
incentive to declare an epidemic on its territory because of the economic implications of decreased trade and travel to affected regions. 253
Reportedly, due to Ebola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea suffered
an estimated USD 2.8 billion in GDP losses (USD 600 million in
Guinea, USD 300 million in Liberia, and USD 1.9 billion in Sierra Leone). 254 Most critically, the outbreak was occurring where already

damaged health care systems had suffered cumulative effects from underdevelopment, years of governmental neglect, structural adjustment
policies, conflict, and narrow post-conflict reconstruction, which could
lead to catastrophic consequences if the disease was not contained
properly. 255
In the face of increasing political pressure, the WHO seized on the
fact that someone with Ebola traveled on an international flight as an
opportunity to revise its initial conservative stance toward the disease. 256 Yet this event-in which someone from Liberia who was infected with Ebola traveled to Nigeria-can hardly be viewed as the
seminal event in the disease's trajectory that the WHO purported it
was.2 57 This is because the epidemic was already international in nature and the PHEIC should have been declared earlier. Certainly, the
disease had already traveled across borders to upend things in three
countries.2 58 The possibility of the disease spreading via air travel was

251.
Sarah Bosley, Ebola: Government Cuts to the WHO Aided Delays in Dealing
with Outbreak, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2014, 1:56 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/09/ebola-who-government-cuts-delays-in-dealing-with-outbreak
[https://perma.cc/4S7C-293X] (archived Jan. 18, 2018).
252.
Id.
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Id.
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THE WORLD BANK, 2014-2015 WEST AFRICA EBOLA CRISIS: IMPACT UPDATE

2 (2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/macroeconomics/publication/2014-2015west-africa-ebola-crisis-impact-update [https://perma.cc/3VWM-AYEX] (archived Jan.
19, 2018).
255.
See Bosley, supra note 251.
256.
Heath, supranote 15, at 29.
257.
See generally Factors that Contributed to Undetected Spread of the Ebola
Virus and Impeded Rapid Containment, WHO (Jan. 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/factors/en/ [https://perma.cc/5A3A-HUZZ] (archived Jan. 18,
2018).
258.
Heath, supranote 15, at 30.
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always present.2 5 9 Yet earlier transmission via foot in the sub-region
was apparently not sufficient to transform concern about Ebola into a
crisis warranting international coordination and decisive action. The
fear of transmission via plane was exemplified in the case of Thomas
Eric Duncan who arrived in Dallas, Texas from Liberia and caused significant consternation in the United States. 260 The screening, testing,
and surveillance measures that were imposed at airports in the subregion were ineffectual. This is in part due to the incubation period of
the disease wherein an infected person could appear asymptomatic,
which appears to be what happened with Mr. Duncan. His case further
crystalized fears that the disease would not remain localized in "Africa," but that it might impact countries in the Global North. In this
manner, the fear of contact with the Global North transformed Ebola
from an unfortunate situation in a "backward" region to a public health
emergency of international concern.
Despite the WHO's recommendations to the contrary, several
states imposed travel bans and trade restrictions on the Ebola affected
countries. 261 This exacerbated already dire conditions and limited the
ability of relief and aid efforts to stem the spread of the epidemic
thereby contributing to structural violence. For example, Australia and
Canada announced travel restrictions on entry from residents of the
262
An independent review panel recomEbola affected countries.
mended that in the future the IHRs be revised such that sanctions can
be imposed on countries that take measures beyond the WHO's recom263

mendations.
The WHO was largely a bystander while more community-driven
strategies for disease containment helped to stop the spread of the disease. Notably, a significant number of respondents in the Afrobarometer survey perceived the treatment facilities of local NGOs to be very

259.
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Hodge et al., supra note 184, at 361.
260.
See Laurence 0. Gostin & Eric Friedman, Ebola:A Crisis in Global Health
261.
Leadership, 384 THE LANCET 1323, 1323 (2014) ("Sierra Leone instituted a national lockdown, Liberia cordoned off swathes of territory, and in Guinea, panicked residents in one
village killed a team that had come to raise awareness about the disease.").
Ian MacDonald, Ebola-Related Immigration Restrictions: Canada, Aus262.
tralia, Singapore and the United States, GREENBERG TRAURIG (Nov. 5, 2014),
https://www.gtlaw-insidebusinessimmigration.com/global-immigration/ebola-relatedimmigration-restrictions-canada-australia-singapore-and-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/26WQ-8EE3] (archived Jan. 18, 2018).
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263.
2
CIDRAP NEWS (July 7, 2015), http://www.cidrap.umn.edulnews-perspective/ 015/07/
[https://perma.cclT9KZ-RM9E]
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(archived Jan. 18, 2018). Currently the 2005 IHRs do not forbid countries from imposing
measures beyond WHO's recommendations, it only requires them to report such
measures if they do not satisfy certain criteria. See IHRs 2005, supra note 3, art. 13.

2018]

EBOLA DOES NOTFALL FROM THE SKY

519

effective in responding to Ebola. 264 For example, Sierra Leone and Li-

beria utilized community care centers because individuals suspected of
having Ebola had to rely on informal networks of care, which put other
household members at high risk of infection. 265 These centers were designed to assist with isolating and providing care for people suspected
of having Ebola who had limited access to formal treatment facilities
due to a lack of available beds. 266

Between March and June of 2016, the WHO declared the end of
the PHEIC for Ebola in the affected countries-forty-two days after the
last person tested positive for the disease. 26 7 The WHO warned the affected countries to maintain heightened surveillance given the risks of
flare-ups and challenges with bringing Ebola completely to heel. 26 8 The
WHO, with the benefit of hindsight, has recognized that it bungled the
response to Ebola. 269 The WHO's omission likely led to greater illness
and death than would otherwise have resulted if the WHO had acted
much earlier. Accordingly, the WHO's failure to timely act was a substantial factor in the resulting structural violence that occurred during
the Ebola epidemic. Moreover, the WHO's failure to act in a timely
fashion frustrated a more effective response to the Ebola epidemic. The
structural violence that occurred because of the WHO's inaction during
the Ebola epidemic was not too accidental in its occurrence to have a
just bearing on the WHO's responsibility.
b. Explanations for the Botched Response
Many explanations have emerged to account for the WHO's failure to properly discharge its obligations in the face of Ebola. Prior to
the Ebola epidemic, the WHO had only issued a PHEIC two other times
since its inception: once for the Swine Flu epidemic in April 2009, and
again for the resurgence of polio in May of 2014. Some commentators
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of respondents in Sierra Leone thought that local NGOs had very effectively responded
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[https://perma.cc/RF64-2CG2] (archived Jan. 18, 2018) (warning of a possible re-emergence).

269.
See Associated Press, WHO Draft Report: We Botched the Response to Africa's Ebola Outbreak, DENVER POST (Oct. 17, 2014, 2:20 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci 26750734/who-draft-report-we-botched-response-africasebola [https://perma.cc/2A4G-K52W] (archived Jan. 18, 2018).
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have pointed to the WHO's hesitance in declaring a PHEIC with Ebola
2 70
due to the stinging criticism it faced for overhyping Swine Flu.
Additionally, the organization identified its institutional culture
and politics as hindering its response to Ebola. 271 For instance, the
WHO has increasingly become a technocratic organization as opposed
2 72
It suffers from
to one responsible for ensuring global public health.
politicization and intra-organization challenges between headquarters
73
in Geneva and regional and country offices. 2 For example, some commentators have faulted African regional personnel for lacking tech274
These indinical knowledge and expertise as well as independence.
viduals appeared to be captured by political interests, which resulted
in contradictory communications from the regional offices and at times
downplayed the severity of Ebola. 2 75
Moreover, WHO personnel initially did not recognize the reality
that basic and essential medical supplies were lacking in the affected
countries. 276 For example, nurses in Liberia were cutting up old uni277
This
forms to protect their faces when working with Ebola patients.
disconnect had dire consequences on the ground with an estimated 512
health care workers dying due to lack of adequate protective gear while
combatting Ebola in the sub-region.2 7 8 Reportedly, more than 10 percent of deaths from Ebola were of health care workers, who the affected
2 79
countries could not afford to see die before their time. The increased
risk for health care workers resulted in strikes with the workers demanding increased pay for treating Ebola cases, as well as more protective equipment and insurance. 280 Yet health care workers were not
the only ones impacted. As discussed in Part II, the disease threatened
systems of social and communal care. However, because structurally

See Daniel Flynn & Stephanie Nebehay, Aid Workers Ask Where Was WHO
270.
in the Ebola Outbreak, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/05/us-health-ebola-who-idUSKCNHU03Q20141005
[https://perma.cc/5UPF-V65F] (archived Jan. 18, 2018).
See, e.g., EBOLA INTERIM ASSESSMENT PANEL, WHO, REPORT OF THE
271.
INTERIM ASSESSMENT PANEL 1 13 (July 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publica-

tions/ebolalebola-panel-report/en/ [https://perma.cc/P24L-PQGV] (archived Jan. 18,
2018) [hereinafter WHO, EBOLA INTERIM REPORT].
See Gostin & Friedman, supra note 261, at 1323; Wilkinson & Leach, supra
272.
note 17, at 140.
Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 140.
273.
See Bosley, supra note 251.
274.
See Heath, supra note 15, at 29; Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 141.
275.
Lee, supra note 134, at 947.
276.
Hodge et al., supra note 184, at 596.
277.
Ebola Situation Report, WHO (Aug. 12, 2015), http://apps.who.int/ebolalcur278.
[https://perma.ccl8CTA-UW3H]
rent-situationlebola-situation-report-12-august-2015
(archived Jan. 18, 2018).
Leach, supra note 8, at 823.
279.
See Ori, supra note 205 (discussing Liberia's National Health Workers As280.
sociation's strike demands).
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the WHO is not equipped to carry out field level support and the Geneva-based technocrats had little logistical experience working in West
Africa, the institution responsible for formulating the global response
to the Ebola epidemic was disconnected from the realities on the
ground. 281
Moreover, the WHO had notice about widespread unpreparedness. The IHRs of 2005 require that state parties develop, strengthen,
and maintain their capacity to "respond promptly and effectively to
public health risks and public health emergencies of international concern." 282 Under Article 54 of the IHRs, countries are to annually selfreport their implementation status to the World Health Assembly. 2 83
Countries are required to develop, strengthen, and maintain the capacity to "detect, assess, notify and report events" under the IHRs. 284 Yet
in 2009, an Independent Review Committee warned the WHO following the H1N1 influenza outbreak that the world was "ill-prepared to
respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly global, sustained and threatening public health emergency."2 85 It also found that
health capacities were nowhere near "a timely path to implementation
worldwide." 286 Further, capacity deficits are especially acute in many
developing countries. 287 The lack of capacity in many states in the
Global South is in part due to historical vulnerability from slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, bad governance, and neoliberal reform policies like structural adjustment. Accordingly, in 2013 prior to the Ebola
outbreak, no African state had fully implemented the IHRs core capacity requirements.2 8 8 And these gaps in core capacities were especially
pronounced in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone because, concomitant
with the structural factors discussed above, the sub-region had a recent
history of conflicts and narrow post-conflict reconstruction, which cumulatively hollowed out the health sector. Ebola was occurring in a
region with severely compromised health systems and with states that
lacked the capacity to prevent the domestic and transnational spread

281.
Lee, supranote 134, at 947-48.
282.
IHRs 2005, supranote 224, art. 13(1).
283.
Id. art. 54.
284.
Id. art. 5(1); see also Agnew, supra note 15, at 120 (noting that detection of
potential health crises is essentially a domestic concern).
285.
WHO, REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) IN RELATION TO THE PANDEMIC (HiNi)

2009 (2011), http://www.who.int/ihr/WHA64_10_HVF_2011.pdf [https://perma.cclB2DLM2WL] (archived Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter REVIEW COMMITTEE 2009 REPORT].
286.
Id.
287.
See Gostin & Friedman, supranote 261, at 1323.
288.
See Steven J. Hoffman, Making the InternationalHealth Regulations Matter: Promoting Compliance Through Effective Dispute Resolution, in HANDBOOK OF
GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 239 (2015) (stating that many countries did not meet June
2012 requirements and requested extensions).
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of the disease.28 9 The WHO apparently recognized this vulnerability
when it eventually declared a PHEIC for Ebola. Margaret Chan, Director-General of the WHO asserted that the countries affected by the epidemic "simply do not have the capacity to manage an outbreak of this
size and complexity on their own" and urged the international commu29 0
nity to provide support.
However, the financial crisis had recently hit global markets and
left the WHO on precarious footing to respond to emergencies as it was
29
severely understaffed and underfinanced. 1 For example, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and some European governments reduced
contributions to WHO, due not only to austerity, but also to their belief
292
As
that the organization needed to engage in essential reforms.
such, it was forced to go through dramatic restructuring following the
financial crisis in order to streamline its operations in line with the
93
reduced contributions it faced.2 For example, in 2011 the organization lost USD 1 billion in funding from core areas and had to cut 300
jobs. 294 One of the main areas that was hit by these shifts was the
WHO's emergency response. Remarkably, the outbreak response team
was dismantled as the organization shifted priorities away from communicable diseases and hemorrhagic fevers-resulting in a significant
295
loss of institutional memory.
The WHO was already on notice that its budget could not be easily
96
repurposed for emergency use. 2 The WHO reportedly only controls a
297
and its funders have competing priormere 30 percent of its budget,
ities. For example, private foundations wield significant influence over
2 98
The
WHO decision making due to their substantial contributions.

Gostin & Friedman, supra note 261, at 1323.
289.
Bosley, supra note 251.
290.
See, e.g., Sheri Fink, WHO Leader Describes the Agency's Ebola Operations,
291.
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/world/africa/wholeader-describes-the-agencys-ebola-operations.html https://perma.cc/D8Y2-78M9 (archived Feb. 15, 2018) (Interview with Dr. Margaret Chan, Director General of the WHO).
See Bosley, supra note 251.
292.
See Leach, supra note 8, at 824 ("The WHO had been through dramatic re293.
structuring and cuts as a result of reduced contributions after the financial crisis.").
Bosley, supra note 251.
294.
Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 140.
295.
See Charles Clift, The Role of the World Health Organizationin the Interna296.
tional System 43 (Working Grp. on Governance, Ctr. on Glob. Health Sec., Working Paper No. 1, Feb. 2013).
See WHO, Proposed Programme Budget 2014-2015, at 2, WHO Doc. A66/7
297.
http://apps.who.int./gb/ebwha/pdf-files/WHA66/A66_7-en.pdf
2013),
6,
(Apr.
[https://perma.cc/332R-3T4M] (archived Jan. 18, 2018) (stating that 77% of WHO's
budget will have to be financed by voluntary contributions).
298.

See

CHARLES CLIFT, CHATHAM

HOUSE,

WHAT'S THE WORLD HEALTH

ORGANIZATION FOR? 28-29 (2014) (noting that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
had become the single largest contributor to the WHO in 2012).
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WHO experienced budgetary limitations when the SARS outbreak began in China and spread worldwide, resulting in the deaths of some
775 people. 299 SARS occurred approximately a decade before Ebola,
and the WHO needed to secure extra funding to fight it.3 00 Despite this
circumstance, it was not a wake-up call for the WHO. The WHO
pointed to indifference at the international level, which further impeded its ability to effectively fight Ebola. 3 0 This was evident when
the United Nations created the Ebola Relief Fund, 302 as there were a
paltry number of initial donations dedicated to it.303
I A Review Committee prior to the Ebola outbreak had recommended that the WHO create a rapid-response emergency fund. 304 The
demand for dedicated funds for public health emergencies was essentially ignored as the WHO's 2014-2015 budget for health crises was a
mere USD 228 million for the entire world-half of what had been allocated the previous year. 305 By way of comparison, the WHO's budget
is only a third of the operating budget of the United States' Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) even though the WHO's work
is far more expansive than just dealing with infectious diseases. 306
Consequently, severe underfinancing of the WHO created ripe conditions for devastating consequences that would accompany the Ebola
epidemic. The WHO had misplaced faith in its ability to quickly secure
funds in the event of an emergency and this lead to structural violence
during its response to Ebola.30 7
c. Responding to Failure
The WHO approximates that it needs more than 30 percent of its
budget to come from mandatory contributions for it to function at full
capacity.30 8 This would enable the organization to be nimbler and have
a reliable source of funding to respond to epidemics like Ebola. Accordingly, the WHO proposed a 5 percent increase of member states' mandatory contributions to it, but this proposal was rejected by the World

299.
Bosley, supranote 251.
300.
Id.
301.
See WHO, EBOLA INTERIM REPORT, supra note 271, ¶22 ("Although WHO
drew attention to the "unprecedented outbreak" at a press conference in April 2014, this
was not followed by international mobilization and a consistent communication strategy.").
302.
Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 141.
303.
Id.
304.

REVIEW COMMITTEE 2009 REPORT, supra note 285.

305.
Proposed Programme Budget 2014-2015, supra note 296, at 8.
306.
Gostin & Friedman, supra note 260, at 1323.
307.
See id.
308.
See Proposed Programme Budget 2014-2015, supra note 297 (stating that
77% of WHO's budget will have to be financed by voluntary contributions).

524

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[voL. 51:477

Health Assembly. 309 Instead, after the Ebola epidemic, the World
Health Assembly approved the creation of a Contingency Fund for
Emergencies (CFE) in May 2015.
The CFE is supposed to provide the resources necessary to scale
up the initial response to outbreaks by funding the first three
months.31 0 The WHO contends that the CFE will enable it to deploy its
311
to work in areas where epiexperts as well as other stakeholders
3 12
The CFE is part of the WHO's effort to imdemics are burgeoning.
prove the way that it responds to epidemics, and it falls under the organization's new unified Emergency Program. The WHO anticipates
that the CFE will assist with alleviating suffering, providing medical
care to those in need, enabling preparedness and surveillance in surrounding areas at high risk, and addressing factors that could lead to
escalation of an emergency.31 3 The CFE is financed through voluntary
314
As of
contributions, with a capitalization target of USD 100 million.
February 2017, states contributed only approximately USD 33 million
towards this goal.3 15 The sustainability of the CFE given this critical
316
funding gap is likely to remain a crucial issue moving forward.
The CFE shows little promise of reducing the incidence of epidemics and avoidable deaths from infectious diseases like Ebola in vulnerable countries. The CFE is a reactionary mechanism. The CFE does
not prioritize building horizontal capacity across the health sector, and
the WHO does not have other funding dedicated to the horizontal de317
to assist with preparvelopment of strong domestic health systems
edness and prevention. As currently designed, the CFE is a stop-gap
measure that does not address the root causes of structural violence
witnessed with the Ebola epidemic and effectively ignores global health
See WHO EBOLA INTERIM REPORT, supra note 271, ¶ 36 (noting that Direc309.
tor's 5% increase proposal was rejected); see generally WHO, Draft Proposed Programme
Budget 2016-2017, WHO Doc. EB136/34 (Jan. 16, 2015), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwhal
pdffiles/EB136/B136_34-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY74-ZDRT] (archived Feb. 9, 2018)
(containing the proposed budget increases).
WHO, CONTINGENCY FUND FOR EMERGENCIES [CFE] (Oct. 13, 2015),
310.
http://www.who.int/about/who reform/emergency-capacities/contingency-fund/Contingency-Fund-Emergencies.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/G6DG-W-UA5] (archived Jan. 18,
2008) [hereinafter WHO CFE].
See Chiara Giorgetti, InternationalHealth Emergencies in Failedand Fail311.
ing States, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1347, 1375-83 (2013) (examining the role played by the
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network in controlling global health emergencies).
See WHO, CFE, supranote 310.
312.
Id.
313.
Id.
314.
Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE): Income and Allocations, WHO,
315.
http://www.who.int/about/who reformlemergency-capacities/contingency-fund/contribution/en/ (last updated Dec. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9MSH-RBDC] (archived Jan. 18,
2018).
See Lee, supra note 134, at 967-68.
316.
See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Towards an InternationalHealth Systems Fund,
317.
384 THE LANCET 49, 49 (2014).
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inequities in state capacities. Since the WHO contributed to the structural violence witnessed, its response needs to do more to mitigate the
harm caused.
Moreover, when states fail to meet the capacity requirements of
the IHRs, the WHO does not provide sticks or carrots to assist with
compliance. 31 8 Yet sanctions as a means of dealing with structural violence that was in part facilitated by global actors seems particularly
inappropriate for addressing global health inequities in capacities. The
harm likely caused by the economic consequences of sanctions concomitant with the socioeconomic impact of the epidemic would frustrate
the affected state's ability to recover.3 19 And economic isolation would
only exacerbate the problems of countries with PHEICs in attempting
to marshal resources to provide treatment and to prevent infectious
diseases from spreading further. 320 Such measures would likely prove
counterproductive and increase tensions at a time when greater international cooperation is needed to combat disease.32 1
As such, the IHRs should be reformed to provide for greater carrots for states to comply voluntarily with core capacity requirements.
This could take the form of capacity building (research and information
sharing), technical assistance (training and the provision of expertise),
and financial and material assistance, especially where states lack the
infrastructure necessary to address epidemics like Ebola domestically.
Rather than leaving states solely responsible for addressing health inequities that exist in part because of the functioning of the international system, this approach would potentially broaden the involvement and cooperation of international actors in addressing highly
infectious diseases.
This subpart has demonstrated how the global public health regime facilitated structural violence and influenced the global inequities
in the distribution of infectious diseases like Ebola. The delayed and
fragmented response to Ebola exposed the weakness and fragility of
the global public health architecture. 322 It also had real consequences
on the likely increased incidence of illness and death that resulted from
the inadequate international response in the Ebola-affected countries.
Under these circumstances, it is fair to find the actors within this regime responsible for contributing to structural violence witnessed during the Ebola epidemic. Specifically, the WHO failed to appropriately
discharge its responsibilities, and its failure to do so was a substantial
factor in the resulting structural violence. The result also cannot be

318.
See Giorgetti, supra note 311, at 1359.
319.
Agnew, supra note 15, at 118.
320.
See Marcella David, Rubber Helmets: The Certain Pitfalls of Marshalling
Security Council Resources to Combat AIDS in Africa, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 560, 574 (2001).
Id.
321.
322.
See Gostin & Friedman, supranote 261, at 1323.
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considered too remote to have a just bearing on the WHO's responsibility. Moreover, the ex ante failure in the international global health regime significantly influenced the course of the Ebola epidemic. Finally,
the organization's ex post facto efforts to mitigate the harm caused by
structural violence for future epidemics is not robust enough.
B. InternationalSecurity & the Regulation of Highly Infectious
Diseases like Ebola
Applying the framework of structural violence to the international
peace and security regime would necessitate the UNSC having a more
expansive interpretation of security. Human security seeks to draw attention to the multitude of threats that cut across different aspects of
323
It seeks to utihuman life including health and related challenges.
lize an integrated, coordinated, and people-centered approach to ad324
vance peace, security, and development within and across nations.
The prioritization of human security is not without its critics, but the
relevance of it is clear, because the security of the individual directly
impacts the security of the state, and this has strong implications for
3 25
In other
international peace and security and global public health.
words, structural violence and human security as organizing principles
enable things other than "guns and boots on the ground" to be considered threats to international peace and security, thus warranting an
international response.
This subpart uses these concepts to analyze whether the actors
within the peace and security regime discharged their responsibilities,
and if they failed to do so, whether the failure to act was a substantial
factor and/or an accelerating factor in the resulting structural violence
that occurred. This subpart evaluates whether it is fair under the circumstances to hold the actors within this regime responsible for contributing to structural violence witnessed during the Ebola epidemic.
Lastly, it assesses the organization's ex post facto efforts to mitigate
the harm caused by structural violence.
1. United Nations' Emergency Powers
Article 24 of the U.N. Charter confers on the UNSC "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"

See What is Human Security, U.N. TRUST FUND FOR HUMAN SEc.,
323.
(last
http://www.un.org/humansecurity/human-security-unit/human-security-approach
visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/JF48-RF7Y] (archived Feb. 8, 2018).
See id.
324.
See Gian Luca Burci & Jakob Qurin, Ebola, WHO, and the United Nations:
325.
Convergence of Global Public Health and InternationalPeace and Security, 18 ASIL
INSIGHTS 25 (2014).
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on behalf of all UN member states. 326 The UNSC has fifteen members,
five of which are permanent members (the P5).32 7 The ten rotating,
non-permanent members represent different regions of the world. 328

UNSC resolutions require the affirmative vote of at least nine members and the "concurring votes" of the P5. 329 Yet unlike the WHO,
which can only issue non-binding recommendations, the UNSC has the
power to create binding resolutions on all other member states of the
United Nations.33 0 The UNSC can take a number of binding measures
to restore international peace and security including authorizing the
use of force and a wide range of actions that do not involve force, such
as economic sanctions.3 3 1
In contrast, the General Assembly (GA) is the main deliberative,
policymaking, and representative organ of the United Nations. Each
country has a vote, and decisions on important questions, like peace
and security, require a two-thirds majority, while decisions on other
questions require a simple majority. Under the Charter, the GA can
consider and discuss issues pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security, but the GA is only empowered to make nonbinding recommendations to the UNSC or member states.3 32 Moreover,
where the UNSC is exercising its jurisdiction over a situation, the GA
is barred from making any recommendations pertaining to that situation unless the UNSC requests it.3 3 3

Like the WHO, the procedures and framework that are set out in
the U.N. Charter provide only the broad framework for emergency decision making. The provisions in the Charter do not determine when a
threat to international peace and security should be declared. As discussed above, the concept of crisis is an inherently political and legal
construct, which justifies extraordinary power. Unlike the WHO,
which is primarily controlled by medical experts, 334 the UNSC is an
overtly political body, which is tasked with determining an essentially
legal and political question.

326.
U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
327.
The United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and France make up
the P5. Current Members, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6ZU2-HKMF] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
328.
The rotating membership on the UNSC is distributed by region: Africathree; Asia-two; Latin America-two; Western Europe and Other-two; and Eastern Europe-one.

Rules

of

Procedure, U.N.

GEN.

ASSEMBLY,

http://www.un.org/en/gal

about/ropgalelect.shtml#2 (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7E87-X9NA] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
329.
U.N. Charter art. 27, T 3.
330.
Id. art. 25.
331.
Id. art. 41 (pacific measures), art. 42 (use of force).
332.
Id. art. 11, ¶¶ 1-2.
333.
Id. art. 12, T 1.
334.
See, e.g., Asher, supra note 173, at 149.
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The UNSC historically has prioritized abuses involving direct
physical violence.3 35 The UNSC has generally waited until mass physical violence reached "crisis point" and has traditionally shied away
from addressing or even discussing the underlying structural causes of
vulnerability.3 3 6 Under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the UNSC is
responsible for determining "the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . .. to maintain or restore
3 37
This Article has been interpreted
international peace and security."
quite restrictively, as the Council is not empowered to take enforcement action whenever it desires, and states have vigorously debated
3 38
what actions fall under a "threat to the peace."
Historically, this has been limited to only acts or threats of physical violence. For example, the UNSC has been very active in West Africa, passing numerous resolutions relating to the conflicts and post33 9
and Sierra Leone. 340 Part II deconflict peace building in Liberia
tailed the ways in which the United Nations and other international
actors voluntarily assumed care and functioned as the de facto government during post-conflict reconstruction. Concomitantly, the United
Nations has also engaged in limited post-conflict reconstruction, which
ignored issues of structural violence and enabled highly infectious diseases like Ebola to spread in the sub-region.
2. International Peace and Security Regime's Response to Ebola
This subpart considers whether the peace and security regime discharged its responsibilities during the Ebola epidemic by examining

See David, supranote 320, at 566-68.
335.
See Anna Hood, Ebola: A Threat to the Parametersof a Threat to Peace?, 16
336.
MELB. J. INT'L L. 29, 41 (2015).
U.N. Charter art. 39.
337.
See Hood, supra note 336, at 35.
338.
The Security Council in 1992 imposed an arms embargo on Liberia. S.C. Res.
339.
788, T 8 (Nov. 19, 1992). In 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to help with the implementation of peace agreements, which operated until 1997. See Liberia - UNOMIL, U.N. PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomilF.html (last visited Feb. 9,
2018) [https://perma.cclH3CT-J6WC] (archived Jan. 22, 2018). Following renewed
fighting in Liberia, on August 1, 2003, the UNSC adopted a resolution authorizing the
establishment of a multinational force in Liberia. S.C. Res. 1497, ¶ 1 (Aug. 1, 2003).
The Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on October 8, 1997
340.
in Sierra Leone. S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 6 (Oct. 8, 1997). In 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). S.C. Res. 1181,
¶ 6 (July 13, 1998). It replaced it with a much broader mission, UNAMSIL with more
military personnel in 1999, to assist the Government and the parties in implementing
the peace agreement. S.C. Res. 1270, 1 8 (Oct. 22, 1990). The UNSC authorize increases
in military personnel in 2000 and 2001. See S.C. Res. 1299, ¶ 1 (May 19, 2000); S.C. Res.
1346, ¶ 2 (Mar. 30, 2001).
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the response of the UNSC, GA, regional organizations, and individual
states.
a. United Nations Security Council
Despite periodic efforts to get the Council to prioritize issues that
lead to human insecurity, for the most part these efforts have been unsuccessful, and the Council has adopted a conservative interpretation
of what rises to the level of a "threat to the peace."3 4 1 For example, it

took twenty years of the HIV/AIDS epidemic ravaging sub-Saharan Africa before the Security Council even met to discuss the disease. 34 2 The
HTV/AIDS epidemic marked the first time that the UNSC issued a resolution on a global public health matter. 343 During the lead up to the
UNSC vote on the resolution, Al Gore (then US Vice President) gave a
speech where he noted that AIDS was a "global aggressor," a "threat to
international peace and security." 344 He encouraged the UNSC to expand its agenda to include security threats from diseases that result in
"constant fear and degradation . . . [and] loss of the quality of life and
liberty of spirit that should belong to all." 345

Yet it was not until the Ebola epidemic had reached its peak near
the end of 2014 that the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2177,
which states "that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in
Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security." 346 The
UNSC Resolution called on states to provide assistance to the affected
states and to lift travel restrictions that isolated the sub-region, and it
called on the WHO to accelerate its response. 34 7 The UNSC urged
member states "to mobilize and provide immediately technical expertise and additional medical capacity [. . .] and to provide essential re-

sources, supplies and coordinated assistance to the affected countries
and implementing partners." 3 48
Remarkably, the Resolution also encouraged Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea to establish better functioning health systems, 3 4 9 as if

341.
See Hood, supra note 336, at 36.
342.
See David, supra note 320, at 561.
343.
See generally S.C. Res. 1308 (July 17, 2000).
344.
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds Debate on Impact
Of Aids on Peace and Security in Africa, U.N. Press Release SC/6781 (Jan. 10, 2000),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000110.sc6781.doc.html
[https://perma.cc/3S6WU9G5] (archived Feb. 9, 2018).
345.
Al Gore, U.S. Vice President, Remarks at the U.N. Sec. Council Opening
Session, (Jan. 10, 2000), CLINTON WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, https://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OVP/speeches/unopen-fp.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2018)
[https://perma.ccl2RX7-B9FQ] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
346.
S.C. Res. 2177, pmbl. (Sept. 18, 2004).
347.
Id. pmbl., TT 1, 4, 12.
348.
Id. T 8.
349.
Id. TT 1-2.
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this could be accomplished simply by UNSC fiat. Moreover, the Resolution essentially ignored the fact that the United Nations and other
international actors were in many respects responsible for managing
and assisting with rebuilding the state following the conflicts in the
sub-region. The large peace-keeping and peace-building missions that
the United Nations operated prior to, during, and after the Ebola out3 51
conbreak in Liberia35 0 and prior to the outbreak in Sierra Leone
tributed to the undermining of state capacity in the health sector due
to a restricted mandate that prioritized responding to direct physical
violence.3 5 2 Narrow post-conflict reconstruction was at least a substantial factor in aggravating or accelerating the harm caused by the Ebola
epidemic because it reduced the likelihood of resilient health systems
that could appropriately respond to pandemics. As discussed in Part II,
this resulted in structural violence with differing risks for infection in
the impacted countries during the Ebola epidemic, and-among those
already infected-serious adverse consequences.
One hundred thirty states sponsored Resolution 2177,ass which is

354
The
the highest number of states to ever sponsor a UNSC resolution.
historic level of support for this Resolution is only curious if considered
when removed from the decades long UN efforts at state building in
the sub-region. Indeed, UNSC resolutions have traditionally not extended to diseases. This includes ailments like malaria, which kills far

See UNMIL Fact Sheet, U.N. PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeep350.
ing.un.org/en/ mission/unmil (last visited Jan. 16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/348E-XRCC]
(archived Jan. 22, 2018); see also UNMIL Background, U.N. PEACEKEEPING,
http://www.un.org/ en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml

(last visited Jan.

16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/64VP-45J6] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
See Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL - Facts and Figures, U.N. PEACEKEEPING,
351.
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsil/facts.html (last visited Jan.
16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/A5YK-67V7] (archived Jan. 22, 2018); see also United Nations
Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Background, U.N.
PEACEKEEPING, https://unipsil.unmissions.orgbackground (last visited Jan. 17, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/Y94W-VBMY] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (discussing the Security Council's establishment of a new mission-the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra
Leone in 2005-to help consolidate peace in the country, which was transformed into
UNIPSIL in 2008 by the UNSC and operated until March 2014).
See UNMIL Mandate, U.N. MISSION IN LIBERIA, https://unmil.unmis352.
sions.org/mandate (last visited Jan. 17, 2018) [https://perma.ccN22W-CDB2 ] (archived
Jan. 22, 2018) (noting the prioritization of protection of civilians from physical violence
and discussing the myriad ways the mission assists with justice and security sector reform amongst others); see also SierraLeone - UNAMSIL - Mandate, U.N. PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsillmandate.html (last visited
Jan. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4T72-9D34 ] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (noting the prioritization of security); see also Mandate and Approach, U.N. INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING

OFFICE IN SIERRA LEONE, https://unipsil.unmissions.org/mandate-and-approach-0 (last
visited Jan. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3FUA-EXKV] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (discussing justice sector reform amongst others).
See S.C. Res. 2177, supranote 346.
353.
Hood, supra note 336, at 37.
354.
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more people per year than Ebola had by the time the UNSC issued
Resolution 2177.3ss

States expressed varying rationales when providing explanations
for their support of Resolution 2177. Some states evidenced a more traditional understanding of a "threat to peace" by explicitly linking the
Ebola outbreak to the prospect of future physical violence. For example, France's representative indicated that Ebola was "threatening to
erase the peace dividends and to reignite chaos" in the affected countries. 356 In this way, Ebola was a "threat to peace" because it was occurring in post-conflict states, whose peace-building efforts might be
undermined due to the instability the disease was causing.3 5 7 Other
states like Chad did not specifically have a conflict nexus in their rationale, but representatives contended that the economic and social instability engendered by the disease within the affected countries and
West Africa more generally posed a threat to peace.3 58
Moreover, many states alluded to the effects Ebola was having on
individuals and remarked on the large number of people killed by the
disease and its potential to kill even more. 359 For instance, Nicaragua's

representative stated that "the international community must act immediately with the aim of saving as many human lives as possible and
prevent the current situation from becoming a humanitarian catastrophe." 360 Other states emphasized the toll in terms of not only deaths,

but also the impact on individuals-China's representative observed
that the disease was "seriously threatening the health and life of [affected] populations." 361 A few states expressed concern over the collateral effects of the Ebola outbreak. For example, the representative
from the Netherlands remarked, "[I]f we do not act now, people not
dying of Ebola may die of starvation." 362 Still, others considered the
psychological effect of the disease on people, with Burundi's representative commenting that the "widespread panic created by the Ebola
crisis in affected countries does not allow people to go about their normal daily productive activities."3 63 Representatives from other states,
like Australia and Luxembourg, were of the view that Ebola was a
"multi-dimensional crisis" that self-evidently "threatened international peace and security." 364

355.
Id. at 46.
356.
U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7268th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7268 (Sept. 18,
2014) [hereinafter U.N. SCOR, Peace and Security in Africa].
357.
Hood, supra note 336, at 38.
358.
U.N. SCOR, Peace and Security in Africa, supra note 356, at 19.
359.
Hood, supra note 336, at 40.
360.
U.N. SCOR, Peace and Security in Africa, supra note 356, at 46.
361.
Id. at 15. Morocco also made similar comments. Id. at 29-30.
362.
Id. at 34. Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Nicaragua and Russia also raised
concerns about starvation and food crises. Id. at 13, 41, 46, 48.
363.
Id. at 41.
364.
Id. at 16, 18.
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Some states implicitly relied on a conceptualization of Ebola as
structural violence, which threatened human security and consequently constituted a threat to the peace. This was reflected in the
statements of numerous states' representatives. For example, Argentina's representative noted that Ebola was "eroding the possibilities of
human social and economic development, which is at the root of most
of the conflicts we deal with in this Council, and which may have con365
Others also implicitly expressed the need to
sequences for security."
address structural violence that leads to human insecurity. An illustration of this is the representative from China's statement that the
"international community should address both the root causes and
symptoms of the problems by assisting African countries in accelerat366
Similarly, Luxeming their economic and social development."
bourg's representative admonished that "[w]e must face up to the
structural challenges that condemn the greater part of the citizens of
West Africa to live in poverty and precarity and that increase their
3 67
vulnerability to shocks such as the Ebola epidemic."
While most accounts were not completely divorced from more traditional security rationales for justifying UNSC action, these statements are still noteworthy because they indicate an implicit acknowledgement of structural violence and its relationship to human security.
The implicit conceptualization of Ebola as a form of structural violence,
which threatened human security and warranted an international response, was not uniformly held. States like Colombia and Brazil preferred for the Ebola outbreak in West Africa to be understood as a "crisis," but not one that rose to the level of threatening international
368
Notwithstanding this, during the depeace and security in general.
bates leading up to the Resolution, many states like South Korea
369
viewed the United Nations as the best platform to coordinate efforts.
Similarly, Russia's representative observed that the challenges faced
by the affected states required the "coordinated response of the international community" and that the Council's discussion and adoption of
3 70
the Resolution was justified.
While the UNSC's Resolution 2177 did not alter the legal meaning
of a "threat to the peace" on its own, it indicates that states are making
implicit, if not explicit, connections between global public health and
security. Yet it may seem hollow or empty that the bulk of the analysis
above examined the rhetoric of states' representatives in the debates
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370.
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surrounding Resolution 2177. This is particularly so when one considers that following Resolution 2177, after states declared Ebola a
"threat to international peace," they decided not to take any enforcement actions.3 7
When faced with threats to international peace and security, the
UNSC generally has used three tools to change state behavior-military action, sanctions, and political leadership. 372 The tool most commonly used by the UNSC is the imposition of sanctions.3 7 3 Yet this
might lead to more damaging socioeconomic consequences, which
would not necessarily contain the spread of Ebola or other diseases,
and would likely exacerbate structural violence. 374 Similarly, the authorization of the use of force would be highly inappropriate for dealing
with infectious diseases and likely would aggravate direct and structural violence. Changing the underlying structures, institutions, laws,
and policies that facilitate structural violence would not be furthered
by allowing for military intervention, which may worsen the conditions
that led to increased rates of mortality and illness from infectious diseases amongst others. Yet there is no limiting principle that would prevent the UNSC from utilizing one of these unsuitable means of intervening in a public health emergency.
Accordingly, the UNSC's more expansive understanding of security must be approached with trepidation. For example, some view the
Council as superfluous-adding an "unhelpful layer of bureaucracy"
and providing no new resources to international efforts to fight infectious diseases.3 7 5 Further, some contend that public health is essentially a domestic concern, which should remain exclusively in the jurisdiction of the relevant states. 376 Moreover, because the international
community has not been able to successfully deal with problems of direct mass personal violence,37 7 there is alarm that it will be even less
equipped and willing to address problems of structural violence presented by infectious diseases like Ebola.
Further, the UNSC could potentially abuse its newfound power.
The UNSC's overt political nature means that it might allow for sovereignty incursions, regardless of whether states in the Global South actually want or need health assistance, and there could be pretextual
interventions.3 78 For example, the UNSC could improperly exceed its

371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

S.C. Res. 2177, supranote 346.
David, supra note 320, at 573.
See U.N. Charter art. 24.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.; see also Agnew, supranote 15, at 124-25.
David, supra note 320, at 563.
See id. at 566.
See id. at 570.
Id. at 571.
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mandate and potentially violate respect for state sovereignty and national autonomy.3 7 9 This could reify geopolitical hierarchies with P5
members exercising oversight of global public health programs aimed
at infectious diseases over less powerful regions, and immunize P5 nations and their allies from such health interventions.
These reservations are not frivolous given how the UNSC has operated in instances of direct violence. For example, NATO engaged in
regime change in Libya when implementing the UNSC authorization
3 80
for use of force, which only contemplated the protection of civilians.
Further, a fundamental concern with UNSC action is that it allows for
selectivity based on power politics, with interventions taking place in
381
which is similar or perhaps
Libya, for example, but none in Syria,
even worse at the time of writing than things were before the international community's intervention in Libya. In the same way that action
at the level of the UNSC is stalled due to the inability to form consensus amongst the P5 members on tougher measures in Syria, a threatened veto could forestall greater responsiveness to structural violence
witnessed with other epidemics. As such, equally or perhaps even more
devastating situations of structural violence may be unaddressed while
more low hanging fruit are prioritized internationally. The potentially
selective enforcement by the UNSC is a precarious method for preventing the spread of epidemics internationally. Given the above considerations, perhaps the most effective role for the UNSC in combatting infectious diseases is applying varying levels of political leadership and
382
pressure to encourage further cooperation from states.
In sum, this subpart has illustrated how the UNSC contributed to
structural violence through an initial narrow framing of what constitutes a "threat to international peace and security." This unduly strict
definition of crises historically perpetuated structural violence and assisted highly infectious diseases to spread, because it prioritized responding to direct violence above all else. In this way, the UNSC helped
to create the conditions for structural violence witnessed with the
Ebola epidemic through a post-conflict reconstruction that neglected
the health sector. Accordingly, while the regime's response during the
epidemic was more robust than it had been for any other disease, this
does not absolve it of responsibility for failing to recognize and respond
to the complex relationship between conflict and disease originally.

Id. at 562-63.
379.
See generally S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
380.
See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar & Anthony Shadid, Russia and China Block
381.
U.N. Action on Crisis in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/syria-homs-death-toll-said-to-rise.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/56L5-24KP] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
See, e.g., Global Ebola Response Coalition, U.N. GLOB. EBOLA RESPONSE,
382.
http://ebolaresponse.un.org/global-ebola-response-coalition (last visited Feb. 9, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/9ZFH-FSSC] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
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b. United Nations General Assembly
In contrast to the UNSC, the GA has been much more willing to
prioritize issues that lead to structural violence. For example, in 2000
the GA adopted the Millennium Declaration and in 2015 the Sustainable Development Goals, which reflect a commitment to address issues
of both direct and structural violence.38 3 The GA's Resolution on Ebola
69/1 referenced the earlier SC resolution that had determined that
Ebola was a "threat to peace" and called on "Member States, relevant
United Nations bodies and the United Nations system to provide their
full support to the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response."3 84
The GA's Resolution 69/1 also requested the Secretary General to
establish the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response
(UNMEER).3 85 UNMEER was an attempt to coordinate the UN response to the epidemic through a unified structure. 386 The humanitarian mission reported directly to the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon,
formally solidifying the connection between global public health and
international peace and security. The GA created the mission in part
because of the WHO's bungling of the initial response and the leadership vacuum this created,3 87 but also because of its own failed postconflict reconstruction.
UNMEER was the institution's first ever emergency health mission and the first system-wide mission of the United Nations. It was
launched on September 19, 2014 and closed on July 31, 2015. Its primary objective was to contain and prevent the spread of Ebola through
case management and safe burial services, to treat infected individuals, and to provide services to affected communities.3 88 The organization touts the initiative as having achieved its objective of scaling up
the response to Ebola on the ground.3 89 Certainly, UNMEER's mobilization far exceeded that of the WHO, with approximately USD 19 million.39 0 The United Nations has lauded the health mission as an innovative approach, which will likely increase "as the nature of global

383.
See G.A. Res. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000); see also G.A. Res. A/RES/70/1
(Oct. 21, 2015).
384.
G.A. Res. A/RES/69/1, pmbl., T 3 (Sept. 19, 2014).
Id.
385.
386.
Statement by the U.N. Secretary-General on the Establishment of the
United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8006
[https://perma.cclYTG6-TH9B]
(archived Jan. 22, 2018).
387.
Lee, supra note 134, at 946-47.
388.
UN Mission for Ebola Response, U.N. GLOB. EBOLA RESPONSE, http://ebolaresponse.un.org/un-mission-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer (last visited Jan. 22,
2018) [https://perma.ccl35M2-HQR4] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
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responses are reshaped to meet the complex challenges of this century."3 9 1 Yet this only serves to highlight the fact that the United Nations' prior peacekeeping missions in the sub-region had essentially ignored the importance of health and the particular risk posed by
epidemics for fragile states, especially those recovering from a recent
history of conflict.
UNMEER was established during an ongoing crisis, with no priors
to refer to for guidelines. For example, many humanitarian organizations were used to working with the United Nations' previously established global public health institutions, which led to coordination problems with UNMEER.3 92 Further, UNMEER prioritized providing
humanitarian relief through the delivery and transportation of quan39 3
These
tities of food instead of desperately needed medical supplies.
logistical difficulties solidified the view amongst some that other bodies
are more well-suited to combatting diseases.
Notwithstanding these logistical challenges, the issues faced are
not insurmountable for future humanitarian health missions, especially where things are stalled at the level of the UNSC. In the past,
the GA has sought to empower itself to act in the event of UNSC paralysis through its Uniting for Peace Resolution. Under this resolution,
the GA resolved that if the UNSC has failed to exercise its primary
responsibility for international peace and security where there appears
to be a threat to or breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, the
Assembly could recommend collective measures to member states to
394
The Uniting
maintain or restore international peace and security.
for Peace Resolution has been used sparingly in practice and has only
been considered legally well-founded where such recommendations are
made in the context of the Assembly calling on member states to support the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.3 9 5 Otherwise, the use of the Resolution has been
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controversial in the use of force context because of its encroachment on
the Council's exclusive power to maintain international peace and security.
Nonetheless, there is some potential for the Assembly to make recommendations under the Uniting for Peace framework for collective
measures in the face of threats posed by epidemics, and in many respects GA action would be preferable to UNSC action since there is less
prospect of the use of blunt measures like sanctions or military interventions. Under the Charter, the GA is empowered to make non-binding recommendations for promoting international cooperation in the
health field and assisting in the realization of human rights amongst
others.3 9 6 Further, the GA is authorized under the Charter to draw the
UNSC's attention to threats that are likely to endanger international
peace and security.39 7 A GA resolution expressing that a particular epidemic is an emerging "threat to international peace and security" and
encouraging member states to provide resources to alleviate the crisis
or to help slow the spread of the disease could be politically influential
for responding to infectious diseases. This could serve as an important
signal of the seriousness with which an epidemic is regarded. As this
is still unchartered territory, it is not yet clear whether there is an element of Ebola exceptionalism, or whether state practice in the GA will
develop to recognize other infectious diseases as emerging threats to
international peace and security.
c. Regional Organizations
An alternative way to circumvent UNSC paralysis with addressing structural violence presented by epidemics is to allow regional organizations like the African Union (AU) 39 8 to act.39 9 During the Ebola
epidemic, the AU held its first meeting about the outbreak early on in
April 2014. It appealed to states with prior experience combatting the
epidemic for support. In August 2014, the AU created the Support to
Ebola in West Africa (ASEOWA) initiative, which was a military and
civilian humanitarian mission with the objective of contributing "to the
ongoing efforts of the national and international community to stop the

and territorial integrity against acts of aggression by North Korea. S.C. Res. S/1657 (July
31, 1950).
396.
See U.N. Charter, art. 13.
397.
Id. art. 11, ¶ 3.
398.
African states founded the AU with a stronger commitment to human rights
and democratic governance than its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. See
Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 3(g)-h), May 26, 2001, 2158 U.N.T.S. 1-37733
[hereinafter AU Constitutive Act].
399.
See Nanjala Nyabola, Ebola: Has the AU Done Enough?, NEw AFRicAN
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://newafricanmagazine.com/ebola-au-done-enoughl#sthash.tkYjXqtw.dpuf [https://perma.cc/9ZFG-48AZ] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
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Ebola transmission in the affected member states, prevent interna40 0
Notably, UNMEER was
tional spread and rebuild health systems."
formed a month after the AU's ASEOWA initiative. The AU released
USD 1 million from the Special Emergency Fund for Drought and Fam401
This was combined with
ine to be dedicated to Ebola relief efforts.
donations from the African private sector amounting to USD 15 million. 402 At the peak of the epidemic, the AU reportedly deployed more
403
than 835 African health workers to the affected countries. ASEOWA
team members ran Ebola treatment units and helped with community
mobilization, they followed up on 49,493 people through contact tracing and provided training to 6,505 local health workers, partners, com404
ASEOWA also asmunity workers, traditional leaders, and others.
sisted with the restoration of health services in eighty-eight public
405
clinics and hospitals.
Unlike the Americas, the African Continent did not have a functioning regional body dedicated to health at the time of the Ebola epidemic. Likely influenced by the regional embarrassment of having the
United States set up a central command center in Liberia in 2014 to
4 06
the AU created the Africa Center for Disspearhead relief efforts,
ease Control (African CDC). The Heads of State of the AU approved
the African CDC in January 2015 to improve prevention, detection,
407
The AU Assembly approved
and response to public health threats.
the statute of the African CDC in January 2016 and is in the process
408
As this is a new organizaof operationalizing this new institution.
tion, it is not yet clear how it will impact epidemics that affect the region, or whether other regions will adopt similar organizations.
d. Individual States
In the absence of a robust and well-funded international regime
for responding to public health emergencies caused by infectious dis-
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eases like Ebola, states intervened individually only when their security interests were directly threatened. 409 For example, a few countries
like Senegal and C6te d'Ivoire closed their borders during the epidemic, 410 which frustrated humanitarian and aid relief efforts given
that they serve as regional hubs for flights to and from the sub-region.
Solidarity from across the continent with the affected countries was
initially lacking, as many countries sought to distance and differentiate themselves from the Ebola-affected countries out of fears of depressing tourism and their economies more generally. During the epidemic, the countries most affected by Ebola relied predominantly on
neo-colonial ties with the United States providing support in Liberia (a
country it helped to create), and the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone
and France in Guinea, both respective former colonies. The United
States became the largest single government donor responding to
Ebola by appropriating USD 5.4 billion in emergency funding, the
greatest amount of emergency funding ever provided by the US Congress for an international health emergency. 4 11 Almost all of this funding (USD 3.7 billion) was directed toward international activities, for
both the initial response as well as ongoing recovery and rebuilding
efforts. 412 Yet when the Zika epidemic hit, a significant amount of US
Ebola assistance was clawed back and repurposed for Zika. 413 Accordingly, reliance on individual state action alone is a risky method for
preventing the spread of epidemics internationally.
The danger is that the harms from infectious diseases like Ebola
may be perceived as localized and concentrated in the affected state(s).
Undeniably, most of the containment efforts to date have stemmed
from "Not in My Backyard" fears of contagion, and the actors most
likely to intervene are those with interests that are not purely, or perhaps not even primarily, humanitarian. Consequently, the perpetual
challenge is how to incentivize states, international institutions, and
other non-state actors to act, when it is not apparent that it is in their
interests to do so.
Overall, the actors in the international peace and security regime-from the UNSC, to the GA, to regional organizations and individual states-responded in diverse ways to address structural violence from Ebola. It is too early to determine whether this indicates an
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emerging recognition by states that global public health inequities in
the spread of epidemic diseases like Ebola can constitute a threat to
international peace and security. Instead, there may be Ebola exceptionalism, since other diseases have not been afforded similar treatment. The analysis above indicates that the regime's historical failure
to recognize that the relationship between infectious diseases and conflict warrants more robust post-conflict reconstruction was the most
substantial factor in contributing to structural violence during Ebola.
This ex ante failure in the international peace and security regime was
ultimately significant in influencing the trajectory of the epidemic. The
regime's ex post response to alleviate the harm caused by structural
violence does not negate the impact of the initial harm.

V. THEORETICAL & POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Because structural violence is viewed as quotidian, it is often not
analyzed as amenable to legal reform. Yet structures are created by
people, and as such structural violence can be prevented and ameliorated.4 14 Structural violence as a framework in this Article helps draw
attention to the arrangement of and relationship between the parts or
elements of complex legal regimes. Structural violence as an analytical
frame in this Article assists with identifying actors, actions, laws, policies, and omissions that might otherwise be unacknowledged. In this
way, the concept assists with apportioning partial responsibility. A major implication of this Article is that a reexamination of the current
framework for international responsibility is needed to adequately address issues of structural violence witnessed with infectious disease.
Additionally, this case study indicates that the complex relationship
between infectious diseases and conflict warrants more robust attention and resources. Lastly, this Part finds that current advances in international disaster law hold promise and need to be developed further,
with an eye towards better addressing structural violence. This author
plans to take up the potential for shared norms of international responsibility and international disaster law to address issues raised by
structural violence witnessed with epidemics in future research.
The Limits of InternationalResponsibility

A.

The main implications of this study for the law of international
responsibility are the need for responsibility to be allocated and the
difficulty in apportioning blame for structural violence. Conventional
understandings of international responsibility locate responsibility
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solely at the level of the state.4 1 5 This allows the activities of IOs and
other non-state actors, and the structural violence that results because
of their functioning, to go un-scrutinized as seen with the analysis of
highly infectious diseases like Ebola. The traditional view of state responsibility under Article 2 of the International Law Commission's
(ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts holds that states are only responsible for conduct attributable to them through action or omission. 416 The general rule is
that conduct is attributable to the state under international law when
it is committed by an organ of the government or when a person or
entity is acting as an agent of the state and exercising elements of governmental authority. 4 17 However, a state can also be responsible to the
extent it fails to take necessary measures to prevent harm, imposing a
standard of due diligence. 4 18 States generally resist principles of responsibility that would hold them responsible for conduct other than
their own-whether those other actors are private, IOs, or other state
actors. 4 19 The way the ILC attempts to deal with situations where
there are multiple state actors that are responsible for wrongdoing is
unsatisfactory because it does not clarify how responsibility is to be
allocated. 4 20 Moreover, states are no longer the only relevant actor in
the international order, and injuries are committed by individuals, corporations, other non-state actors, and IOs, amongst others.
Current legal reform efforts at expanding international responsibility are inadequate. For example, the ILC has proposed making
states responsible in certain situations where they delegate authority
to an IO, which then violates rights. 42 1 The proposal would hold states
accountable even where the injury was solely attributable to the 10.422
Yet to address many of the most pressing problems, individual states
acting alone will be powerless to make any significant difference. 423
Recognizing this, the ILC has also proposed that an IO can be responsible in connection with the wrongful acts of states where, for example,
the organization adopts a decision that requires states to commit acts

415.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at
43 (2001) [hereinafter Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibility of States]
416.
Id.
417.
See id. at 44.
418.
See generally Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J.
INT'L. L. 341 (2010) (providing a framework for determining when a state must protect
someone from a third party).
419.
Andr6 Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Shared Responsibility in International
Law: A ConceptualFramework, 34 MICH. J. INT'L L. 359, 386 (2013).
420.
See Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibility of States, supra note 415, at 55.
421.
See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-First Session, U.N. Doc.
A/64/10, at 163--66 (2009).
422.
Id.
423.
See Nollkaemper, supra note 46, at 283.
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424
that contravene international obligations.
IOs like the United Nations have been found to have international
legal personality, 425 which enables them to make claims and to have
claims made against them. At the same time, IOs are layered organizations that consist of member states. Notably, the Draft Articles on
the Responsibility of International Organizations recognize that in situations of internationally wrongful acts where there is concerted action
between IOs and states, both the states and the IOs have shared responsibility. 426 The Draft Articles also provide for shared responsibility
between IOs and other international organizations, although they do
not clarify how these responsibilities are to be allocated amongst other
actors. 427 Yet increasingly IOs also have public-private partnerships
and rely on private actors, especially in the field of global public health
as witnessed with the Ebola epidemic. Furthermore, IOs and private
actors like corporations may not necessarily be bound by international
law obligations or even soft law in many areas, and if they are, their
obligations may not be the same as states.
This has created what one scholar has termed "responsibility
gaps."4 28 Such gaps can occur in many ways. One of the main challenges to conceptualizing international responsibility beyond the state
is the multiplicity of actors at the international level that may or may
not act in concert to produce a single injury; this can include governments acting individually or collectively, international and regional organizations, civil society, corporations, community-based actors, and
individuals, amongst others. This occurs with instances of structural
violence, where there is overdetermination because there are too many
actors involved in the process that caused the harm. This may also lead
to challenges in identifying which actor is responsible for what due to
429
Additionlack of information or knowledge about a given situation.
ally, a responsibility gap may persist because during instances of structural violence, where it is not necessarily obvious who should respond,
4 30
a bystander effect where no actor responds may result.
A responsibility gap may also occur because the individual actions
of multiple actors may be distributed in a way that does not meet the

Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, Draft Arti424.
cles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, art. 17
(2011) [hereinafter Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibility of International Organizations].
See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
425.
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174 (Apr. 11).
See Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibility of International Organizations, supra
426.
note 424, art. 19.
See id. art. 48. For further discussion, see Nollkaemper & Jacobs, supra note
427.
419 at 396-97.
See Nollkaemper, supra note 46.
428.
See id. at 296.
429.
See generally Hakimi, supra note 418.
430.
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requirements of international responsibility, which dictates that responsibility is only assigned to actors whose individual contributions
are significant enough to pass the minimum threshold. 431 In other areas of law, problems of overdetermination are dealt with by a number
of doctrines-joint and several liability in tort law and joint criminal
enterprise in international criminal law, by way of example. 4 32 These
principles have not been incorporated into the international law of responsibility, perhaps for good reasons. 4 33 In part, this likely reflects the
practical consideration that the higher the risks of responsibility, the
more cautious actors will be in accepting international obligations. Yet,
even if actors are willing to accept higher obligations, all international
dispute settlement mechanisms are premised on state consent, and
most do not have jurisdiction over other IOs or corporations. 434 Thus,
a responsibility gap will likely be maintained where a harm is the result of structural violence, because adjudication of a claim may not be
able to proceed against the state if it withholds its consent to jurisdiction and in any event would not include the other international actors
involved. This presents seemingly insurmountable challenges for attempting to provide full redress for structural violence witnessed with
Ebola through traditional principles of international responsibility.
The law of international responsibility, like other areas of international law, is not neutral. It reflects the choices and practices of
states and allows states and non-state actors to engage in blame-avoid-

431.
See Nolkaemper, supra note 46, at 290.
432.
For further discussion, see Nolkaemper & Jacobs, supra note 419, at 423
(discussing the substantive and procedural challenges with applying the private law
principle of joint and several responsibility into a public international law context); id.
at 425 (discussing the challenges with applying the principle of joint criminal enterprise
to determining the responsibility of states and international organizations given the
need to demonstrate mens rea and other concepts); see also Roger P. Alford, Apportioning
Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law Violations, 38 PEPP. L.
REV. 233 (2011) (discussing how domestic tort law concepts can be applied to challenges
related to apportioning responsibility of international law violations); Kai Ambos, Joint
Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 159 (2007)
(comparing the doctrines of joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility liability in the prosecution of international crimes); Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of
Individual Responsibility Under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 109, 110 (2007) (pointing out the difficulties in identifying specific contributions made by each individual party involved in an international crime); Jens David
Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 69, 70 (2007) (analyzing the international doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise); Herman G. van der Wilt, The Continuous Quest for ProperModes of Criminal
Responsibility, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 307 (2009) (identifying the challenges associated
with choosing the most proper mode of criminal responsibility in international law).
433.
See Nollkaemper, supra note 46, at 303-07.
434.
Id. at 307.
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ance and blame shifting for harmful consequences of structural vio435
Due to the challence and to shield themselves from responsibility.
the
results-like
violence
lenges discussed above, where structural
be
will
parties
avoidable deaths during the Ebola epidemic-injured
infor
conditions
the
without redress. This could occur either because
ternational responsibility are not met or responsibility cannot be determined, and it is also not possible to bring an effective claim against
the collectivity as such.4 36 Yet one of the underlying principles of attributing responsibility is that every legal injury deserves a remedy to
ensure

justice to victims. 4 37

The dominant paradigm of international responsibility depends
43 8
However, when
on an identifiable actor who acts to produce injury.
the actors are too numerous, and/or the injury is embedded in institutions, the dominant paradigm is unable to provide redress and fails to
capture the harms caused by structural violence. Thus, the increased
rates of mortality and illness from infectious diseases like Ebola are
generally unaccounted for. This makes it incredibly difficult to secure
effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress for
structural violence. 439 The law of international responsibility privileges the status quo and directs attention towards individual claims
against specific actors for identifiable harms and away from legal re440
esform efforts and concepts of shared international responsibility,
limitations
the
pecially in the field of global public health. Because of
in utilizing traditional principles of responsibility, it is necessary to reconceptualize international responsibility. Accordingly, much more research 44 1 is needed on the potential for shared norms of international
responsibility 4 42 to better respond to structural violence, which this author plans to do in future work.

435.
Id. at 298.
436.
Id. at 306.
Id.
437.
See Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibility of States, supra note 415, at 43.
438.
See NIXON, supra note 21, at 9.
439.
See generally Nolkaemper & Jacobs, supra note 419.
440.
See generally Benjamin Mason Meier et al., Employing Human Rights
441.
Frameworks to Realize Access to an HIV Cure, 18 J. INT'L AIDS SOC'Y 1 (2015).
442.

See, e.g., INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT xi (2001) [hereinafter R2P REPORT]; see also U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declarationon Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/ (Vol. I), Annex I, Principle 7 (Aug. 12, 1992). Under the
principle, developed countries agree to take on higher obligations to combat environmental concerns like climate change to reflect consumption and production patterns as well
as the unequal distributions of risks of climate change which results in more devastating
consequences for poorer countries. See, e.g., Paris Agreement to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015fL.9.; U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, May 9,
1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107
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B. Complex Relationship between Infectious Diseases & Conflict
Another implication of this study is the need to acknowledge and
appropriately respond to the complex relationship between conflict and
infectious diseases. The Ebola case study indicates that emphasizing
the link between international peace and security and global public
health might motivate countries in the Global North to comply with
the IHRs obligations to assist other states with capacity-building of
their domestic health sectors. 443 This link seemingly galvanized state
and non-state actor action during the outbreak and led to the formation
of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) in 2014.444 The goal of

the GHSA is to "advance a world safe and secure from infectious disease threats, to bring together nations from all over the world to make
new, concrete commitments, and to elevate global health security as a
priority." 44 5 Membership in the initiative is open to all countries and at
the time of this writing nearly fifty nations are part of the GHSA, along
with international organizations like the WHO as well as non-governmental stakeholders. 446
The GHSA was created to facilitate collaborative, capacity-building efforts to achieve specific targets that are tied to the core capacities
under the IHRs. While the IHRs require its 196 state parties to cooperate to help build health capacities, 44 7 they do not articulate how this
is to work in practice. 448 The GHSA fills in this lacuna by creating a
framework for countries to address their commitments. The GHSA has
eleven Action Packages that are designed to help build state capacity
to prevent, detect, and respond to threats posed by infectious diseases. 449 Under the GHSA, member countries can utilize a tool that
helps to assess baseline national health security capacity. An action
plan can then be tailored with five-year targets for states to meet with
a set of indicators to measure progress, as well as various activities to

443.
See Gostin, supra note 317.
444.
About, GLOB. HEALTH SEC. AGENDA, https://www.ghsagenda.org/about (last
visited Feb. 9, 2018) [https:/perma.cc/C8JQ-PJZT] (archived Jan. 21, 2018) [hereinafter
GHSA, About].
445.
Id.
446.
Id.
447.
Gostin & Friedman, supranote 261, at 1323.
448.
Id.
449.
The prevention action packages cover: antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic diseases like Ebola, biosafety and biosecurity as well as immunization. Action Packages,
GLOBAL HEALTH SEC. AGENDA, https://www.ghsagenda.org/packages (last visited Feb. 9,
2018) [https://perma.cc/2SAA-CLS4] (archived Jan. 22, 2018). The detection action packages address: national laboratory systems, real-time surveillance, reporting and workforce development. Id. While the response packages focus on: emergency operations centers, linking public health with law and multi-sector rapid response and medical
countermeasures and personnel deployment. Id.
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support successful implementation. One of the key aspects of the external evaluation tool is the ability to highlight gaps and needs for current and prospective donors, as well as to inform and assist country450
level planning and priority setting.
Understandably, the countries most impacted by Ebola-Liberia,
451
For example, durSierra Leone, and Guinea-joined this initiative.
ing the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in November of 2015, only 35
percent of health facilities reported to their respective districts. By
September 2016, with the help of the GHSA, this increased to 96 per452
Early indications similarly show the GHSA
cent of health facilities.
is having an impact in Liberia. Prior to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Liberia had very few trained "disease detectives," but with the support of
the GHSA at the end of 2016 the country had a total of 115 trained
"detectives" covering all fifteen counties and ninety-two health districts. 45 3 These initiatives will likely assist with early detection of epidemic diseases.
Additionally, there is evidence suggesting that investment in the
promotion of protective and primary care services in the Global South
leads to large improvements in public health, which generate benefits
4 54
Accordingly,
for other states, like containment of epidemic diseases.
under the GHSA, member countries can reach their commitments by
building capacity nationally, regionally, or globally. For example, the
United States made a commitment to assist thirty-one countries and
the Caribbean Community to achieve eleven measurable GHSA targets. 4 55 The United States has invested USD 1 billion in resources
across seventeen of these countries that need the most assistance with
capacity building to detect and respond to future infectious disease outbreaks. 456 The US rationale for participating in the GHSA is simple:
the "most effective and least expensive way to protect Americans from
diseases and other health threats that begin abroad is to stop them

450.

Assessments, GLOB. HEALTH SEC. AGENDA, https://www.ghsagenda.org/as-

sessments (last visited Feb. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cclV5XF-2FTJ] (archived Jan. 22,
2018).
SEC.
AGENDA,
HEALTH
GLOB.
&
Membership,
451.
Members
https://www.ghsagenda.org/members [https://perma.ccl7HDK-GPW3] (archived Jan. 22,
2018); see, e.g., JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, WHO,

MISSION REPORT (Sept. 2016).
452.
AGENDA:

GLOB. HEALTH SEC. AGENDA, ADVANCING THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY
7,
INVESTMENT
U.S.
FROM
IMPACT
EARLY
AND
PROGRESS

https://www.ghsagenda.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/ghsa-legacyreport.pdfsfvrsn=12 [https://perma.cc/99ZR-LAU6] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) [hereinafter GHSA, ADVANCING THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA].

453.
454.

Id. at 10.
See Agnew, supra note 15, at 119.

455.

GHSA, ADVANCING THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA, supranote 452,

at 2.
456.

Id.
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before they spread to our borders."45 7 Additional donor countries and
organizations have provided a collective commitment to assist seventysix countries to reach the capabilities described in the IHRs. The GHSA
is based on the view that global health security is a "shared responsibility" that cannot be achieved by a single actor or sector of government. 458 While neither it nor the IHRs determine how responsibility

for capacity building should be allocated, 45 9 the GHSA is laudable as it
is a proactive measure that does not ignore global health inequities in
state capacities but instead tries to remedy them.
Yet this initiative might sustain a problematic role between countries in the Global South and Global North, with the former being primarily donor recipients and the latter generally consisting of donors.
There is rich foreign aid literature that discusses the mismatch between donor and recipient countries' priorities, with aid supplanting
local needs. 460 For instance, donor governments and NGOs often direct
aid to specific health projects and diseases through vertical projects
like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. 46 1 This
practice may undermine the development of a comprehensive public
health system with the surveillance needed for proper disease
prevention. For instance, the proliferation of actors and fragmentation
of health delivery prior to the Ebola epidemic meant that there was
often a mismatch between national priorities for health development
and partner organizations' funding stipulations. Accordingly, the less
sexy task of building up the capacity of the state health sector horizontally and shoring up its ability to train, pay, and retain qualified health
staff was not prioritized. 462 Thus, there is a danger that this initiative
might replicate structural violence.
Additionally, this initiative runs the risk of securitizing health. 4 63
The move towards securitization means that epidemic diseases will receive more salience under this framework than non-infectious diseases
due to the risk of transnational transmission. Yet non-communicable
diseases may result in more structural violence than infectious diseases. For example, common ailments like malaria kill far more people
per year than Ebola. 464 Further, sovereignty concerns and fears of pre-

textual and frequent interventions from powerful countries may limit

457.
Id. at 10.
458.
GHSA, About, supra note 444.
459.
See Gostin & Friedman, supra note 261, at 1323.
460.
See The Mismatch Between Donor Priorities and Global Health Needs,
CITIZEN NEWS SERV. (Feb. 2013), http://www.citizen-news.org/2013/02/the-mismatch-between-donor-priorities.html [https://perma.cc/WA5G-E7G9] (archived Jan. 22, 2018)
(discussing the "mismatch between donor priorities and global health needs").
461.
Wilkinson & Leach, supranote 17, at 140.
462.
Leach, supranote 8, at 823.
463.

See BARRY BUZAN ET AL., SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 18

(1998) (discussing the issues surrounding the process of securitization).
464.
Hood, supra note 336, at 46.
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the desire of states to formally expand the relationship between epidemic diseases and conflict. Indeed, treating an epidemic as a security
problem could lead to the unhelpful militarization of epidemics and the
sending of troops to address public health emergencies as opposed to
medical personnel. 465 While military and civilian humanitarian missions were utilized during the Ebola epidemic, it may be ill-conceived
to consider security-oriented organizations to have any ability to understand the scope and nature of public health crises and to be able to
effectively address them through coherent policies as a regular matter. 466 Although the merits of securitizing issues of health potentially
draw additional resources, doing so could lead to inadvertent consequences and can have ramifications of allowing for extraordinary re4 67
sponses typical to how issues of direct violence are addressed, which
may be inappropriate for dealing with structural violence. In sum,
there is a need to acknowledge the relationship between infectious diseases and conflict. Yet due to the risk of inappropriate responses, the
reification of the relationship between conflict and infectious diseases
must be approached with trepidation so as not to further structural
violence.
C. InternationalDisasterLaw & Responding to Epidemics
Finally, this Article finds that much more is needed than reform
in each of the discrete regimes analyzed. Instead, reexamination of the
current framework for responding to crises is needed to adequately address issues of structural violence. International disaster law is a
framework for responding to complex international emergencies that
spans different regimes and may have utility for addressing issues of
structural violence witnessed with the Ebola epidemic. This subpart
analyzes the current efforts to address nested domestic and international law failures through non-binding aspirational international
law

46

8 to reduce disasters.

In 2015, states passed a non-binding resolution to reduce the risk
of disasters under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015-2030.469 The goal of the initiative over the next fifteen years is to
reduce "disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in
the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of

See Agnew, supra note 15, at 124-25.
465.
See David, supra note 342, at 578.
466.
See Thomas, supra note 34, at 1830.
467.
Also known as soft law, which seeks to be recognized by states as hard law
468.
and to influence state practice.
See generally Third U.N. World Conference, Sendai Framework for Disaster
469.
Risk Reduction 2015-2030, U.N. Doc. A.IRES./69./283 (June 23, 2015) [hereinafter Sendai Framework].

2018]

EBOLA DOES NOT FALL FROM THE SKY

549

persons, businesses, communities and countries." 470 The third priority
area of focus is private investment in disaster risk prevention and reduction through structural and non-structural measures to enhance
the economic, social, health, and cultural resilience of persons, communities, countries, and their assets, as well as the environment. 47 1 The
Framework recognizes that states have the primary role to reduce disaster risk but that responsibility should be shared with other stakeholders. 4 72 Under the Framework, disaster risk reduction is a common
concern for all states and calls for sustainable international cooperation towards enhancing the capabilities of countries in the Global
South. 4 73 The Framework is not simply reactionary to structural violence, but seeks to stimulate efforts to build better core public health
capabilities for disease surveillance and health systems strengthening.
However, many countries in the Global North have generally failed to
comply with the JHRs' obligations to assist other states with capacitybuilding of their domestic health sectors. 474 The Sendai Framework's
endorsement by the UNGA 475 potentially indicates a willingness for
further international cooperation through capacity building for better
prevention, detection, and treatment of epidemics.
More recently, the ILC adopted the Draft Articles on The Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters. 476 The Draft Articles are complementary to the Sendai Framework and propose that states "reduce
the risk of disasters by taking appropriate measures, including
through legislation and regulations, to prevent, mitigate, and prepare
for disasters." 4 77 This provision potentially protects against the risk
that this framework will only apply once an epidemic has emerged.
Presumably, the more detailed Sendai Framework will help to clarify
the measures states should adopt to meet this duty as well as their
obligations under the IHRs to cooperate to help build health capacities. 478 Moreover, the disaster risk reduction framework may be of relevance to post-conflict reconstruction given the lower levels of institutional resiliency.
The Draft Articles define disaster as "a calamitous event or series
of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering

470.
Id. T 16.
471.
Id. T 29.
472.
Id. ¶ 19.
473.
Id.
474.
See Gostin, supranote 317.
475.
Sendai Framework, supra note 469.
476.
See generally Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eight Session,
Draft Articles on The Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, U.N. Doe. A/71/10
(2016) [hereinafter Int'l Law Comm'n, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters].
477.
Id. art. 9.
478.
See Gostin & Friedman, supra note 261, at 1323.
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and distress, mass displacement, or large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society." 4 79 This definition would likely prioritize situations where structural violence results in extreme threats to human security as the
result of pandemic diseases. For instance, the framework could be triggered if the epidemic has reached a point of "disaster," based on an
assessment of: the scope of the structural violence, the severity of the
suffering and human rights violations, the causes of structural violence, the states' (and other actors') relation to this structural violence,
and the existence of feasible solutions. However, the emphasis on
"event," as opposed to the consequences of events, may limit the ability
of the Draft Articles to be responsive to structural violence witnessed
with infectious diseases. Yet the language of "series of events" may allow enough malleability to apply to slower forming pandemics. Notably, the Articles do not limit the definition of disaster to natural or human-made events, which means that it could apply to issues of
structural violence witnessed with epidemics.
Under the Draft Articles, the affected state has a duty to ensure
protection to persons and the provision of disaster relief in its territory,
but where a disaster manifestly exceeds its capacities, the affected
state has a duty to seek assistance from other states, the United Nations, and others. 48 0 However, the Draft Articles are careful not to undermine sovereignty concerns, providing that affected states have the
"primary role in the direction, control, and supervision of assistance." 481 Moreover, the Draft Articles require that the affected state
consents to the provision of external assistance but that such consent
2
shall not be withheld arbitrarily. 48 The Draft Articles are compatible
with the global public health regime. For example, the WHO is similarly limited by the sovereignty of its member states and cannot act to
assist a state in responding to an infectious disease unless the state
48 3
The principle of non-ininvites the WHO in to provide assistance.
terference is reflected in the statement of Director-General Chan during the Ebola epidemic that affected nations have "first priority to take
care of their people." 484 Yet affected states were not able to effectively
implement the WHO's recommendations of treatment centers, adequate compensation for health workers, and personal protective equip48 5
And no effective governance strucment due to capacity constraints.
tures existed internationally to fill the gap between the law in the

Int'l Law Comm'n, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra
479.
note 476, art. 3.
Id. arts. 10-11.
480.
Id. art. 10.
481.
Id. art. 13.
482.
WHO Constitution, supranote 225, art. 2(c).
483.
Fink, supra note 291.
484.
Gostin & Friedman, supra note 261, at 1323.
485.
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abstract and the contextual reality of these health deficits. 486 The disaster risk reduction framework presents a possible avenue.
The Draft Articles provide for a duty for states to cooperate
amongst themselves, with the United Nations, and with other actors. 4 87 Yet arguably the U.N. Charter already compels member states
to provide international assistance and cooperation. 48 8 Under Article
56 of the Charter, member states are "to take joint and separate action
in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."489 And Article 55 provides that the United
Nations shall promote "solutions of international economic, social,
health, and related problems and international cultural and educational cooperation." 490 Article 55 also provides in relevant part that the
United Nations should promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and development as well as universal respect for and observance of human rights. 4 91 Reading these
provisions together presumably provides a basis to argue that states
are obligated under the Charter to cooperate with the United Nations
and other actors to prevent, detect, and arrest pandemics.4 92 An obligation to cooperate can also be located under international human
rights law. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights'
(CESCR) has emphasized that "[s]tates parties should recognize the
essential role of international cooperation and comply with their commitment to take joint and separate action to achieve the full realization
of the right to health."4
Significantly, the Draft Articles do not establish a duty to provide
assistance. 494 Instead, the Draft Articles include a procedural element
of proper evaluation of requests for assistance. 495 However, per the
CESCR, states have an obligation subject to the availability of resources to "facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and ser-

486.
Wilkinson & Leach, supranote 17, at 141.
487.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra
note 476, art. 7.
488.
U.N. Charter, art. 56.
489.
Id. art. 55.
490.
Id. art. 55(b).
491.
Id. art. 55(a), 55(c).
492.
Some argue that the Charter does not legally empower the UNSC to force
member states to provide assistance. See David, supra note 320, at 574; see also
MALCoLM LANGFORD ET AL., GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES 54-55 (2013).

493.
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No.
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), adopted at the
Twenty-Second Session of the CESCR, 1 38, U.N. Doc. No. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 141.
494.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra
note 476, art. 12.
495.
Id.
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vices in other countries, wherever possible, and [to] provide the necessary aid when required." 496 Additionally, the Committee has found
that states have a "joint and individual responsibility," under international law, "to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian
assistance in times of emergency."497 As such, states are to contribute
to this task, giving priority in the provision of international medical
aid, distribution, and management of resources and financial aid to the
49 8
The
"most vulnerable or marginalized groups of the population."
Committee also stressed that given that some diseases are "easily
transmissible beyond the frontiers of a State, the international com499
munity has a collective responsibility to address this problem."
Moreover, the CESCR underscored that state parties to the Covenant
in the Global North have a special responsibility and an interest to as5 00
sist poorer states in the Global South with epidemic diseases.
However, a more expansive notion of responsibility at the international level may lead to calls for the adoption of international Good
Samaritan laws. 50 1 While domestically some states offer immunity to
Good Samaritans, sometimes statutes are framed in a way that allows
for claims of negligent care, and/or exempt from immunity parties that
act in an intentional or reckless manner in rendering aid. Moreover,
Good Samaritan laws are usually inapplicable to actors that provide
emergency assistance due to obligation (e.g. during the course of their
regular employment). Accordingly, increasing international responsibility for structural violence witnessed with infectious diseases may
create perverse disincentives for actors to voluntarily render assistance or consent to more robust international responsibility norms. Indeed, how to bridge the gap between law, policy, and reality internationally regarding global health inequities is a fundamental challenge.
This author plans to investigate in future works how the disaster risk
reduction framework can be developed and applied to effectively respond to structural violence witnessed with epidemics.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Article maintains that the international community's current
approach to addressing infectious diseases like Ebola, as public health

CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supranote 493, ¶ 39.
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A Good Samaritan refers to someone who renders aid in an emergency to an
501.
injured party on a voluntary basis. The party rendering aid generally has a duty to be
reasonably careful, but most states do not require individuals to render aid in the first
place.
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crises susceptible to individual country medical interventions, is problematic because it obscures the focus from changing the social, legal,
and physical environments that help to produce these epidemics. This
Article demonstrates that effectively tackling the disproportionate distribution of infectious diseases within countries in the Global South is
a fundamental challenge for international law and international relationS. 502
Further, this Article argues that the way international crises are
conceptualized needs to be expanded beyond merely addressing direct
physical violence internationally. Instead, this project sustains that international responses must also include remedying structural violence.
Structural violence involves multiple harms and injuries, which often
result from numerous actors and institutions. Unlike traditional conceptions of violence, structural violence is unique and is characterized
by delayed effects in which both the causes and the casualties are discounted and unremembered. This is especially evident in the distribution of highly infectious diseases. Structural violence as an analytical
frame in this Article assists with identifying actors, actions, laws, policies, omissions, and partial and cumulative responsibility that might
otherwise be unacknowledged. This Article provides a useful framework for how the concept of structural violence can be operationalized
in law.
The concept of structural violence assists with apportioning partial responsibility. Accordingly, a key finding of this Article is that figuring out how international actors should account for structural violence is not at all straightforward. Traditional principles of
international law perpetuate the fallacy that states can on their own
cope with the problems created by globalization, including the increased incidence of infectious diseases like Ebola. Yet states are not
self-sufficient, and this Article shows that the distribution of infectious
diseases like Ebola is fundamentally conditioned in part by transnational actors and global institutions. As such, responsibility for addressing this structural violence must be shared across a wide range of
actors.5 0 3
This Article concludes that reconceptualizing international responsibility would require a much more forward-looking approach than
conventional approaches to responsibility. This shared approach to responsibility would encapsulate prospective obligations to aid or provide
humanitarian and disaster relief. As such, this Article also finds that
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CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 493 (referencing the 1978
WHO Alma-Ata Declaration, which stated that gross health inequities between developed and developing countries, as well as within countries, is politically, socially and
economically unacceptable and is of common concern to all countries).
503.
See Lindsey N. Kingston & Saheli Datta, Strengtheningthe Norms of Global
Responsibility: Structural Violence in Relation to Internal Displacement and Statelessness, 4 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 475, 478 (2012).
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it is necessary to develop the emerging disaster risk reduction framework in international law to adequately address issues of structural
violence witnessed with infectious disease like Ebola.
An expanded conceptualization of responsibility would mean that
states, IOs, and other non-state actors would have a moral and undoubtedly contested legal duty to recognize and act upon the threats
posed by structural violence. Past practices that led to structural vio504
lence impose an obligation to mitigate or remedy the harm caused.
This duty as applied to infectious diseases like Ebola would be based
50 5
but also legal obligations of
on not only principles of global justice,
international cooperation and duties under international human rights
law. In addition, this obligation would be rooted in naked self-interest
because highly infectious diseases do not respect borders. Ultimately,
states are self-interested and do not want to see their "own people" die
of Ebola or some other infectious disease.
In the end, it may be that state and non-state action is galvanized
to fight pandemics not because of a recognition of the structural violence caused, nor necessarily because of humanitarian impulses or
transnational solidarity, nor even because an actor accepts that it has
violated an international duty. Instead, it may be that state and nonstate action is motivated out of a shared self-interest. Accordingly, it is
worth considering what possibilities exist for harnessing this shared
self-interest to expand principles of international responsibility in a
manner that reduces disasters and better addresses structural violence
posed by infectious diseases. In sum, it is vital to reduce the responsibility and accountability gaps in international law, because ultimately
"we must assume responsibility for the unintended and invisible con50 6
sequences of our individual and collective doings."
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See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHL. & PUB. AFF.

113 (2005) (discussing the role of states to remedy inequities); Thomas W. Pogge, Re-

sponsibilities for Poverty-Related Ill Health, 16 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 71, 72-74 (2002)
(discussing the role of individual citizens within developed countries to remedy harm).
There are several common objections to global justice claims. The most com505.
mon is the idea that IOs lack the necessary underlying social context of a state for the
application of justice- for example the idea of an international society is contested, such
that discussions of justice are incoherent, because no community exists to support obligations of justice. Another view contends that global justice is meaningless, because
there is not a global social contract to make the concept enforceable. An additional objection questions the existence of a normative consensus to support truly "global" perspectives on justice.
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506.
FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1780 (2004).

